Daily Report

East Europe

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FBIS-EEU-95-056 *23 March 1995*

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NOTICE TO READERS: This volume contains a representative selection of material previously disseminated in softcopy format.

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Agreement on Closer Cooperation With Hungarians

AU2203213995 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 21 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Hungarian Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti arrived in Albania today on a two-day official visit, heading a military delegation. Keleti was received by Albanian Defense Minister Safet Zhulali and General Sheme Kosova, chief of the Army General Staff, as well as other military officials.

The Hungarian delegation held its first meeting at the Defense Ministry with General Kosova, who briefed the delegation on the work to reform and strengthen our army and the efforts and development of joint exercises in the framework of the Partnership for Peace [PFP] with the aim of becoming a NATO member.

The Hungarian defense minister, for his Keleti assessed achievements in the reforming of the army and efforts to strengthen it.

Talks between the Albanian and Hungarian delegations were held at the Defense Ministry this evening. Our defense minister focused on the work currently carried out in the Albanian Army to strengthen and integrate it into the democratic society. Zhulali then focused on cooperation with NATO and the PFP countries. Zhulali also stressed aspects of efforts to reform military education, and the need for assistance in this direction and other fields.

They later discussed the situation in the region, the tense situation in Kosova, relations with neighbors, etc. Both sides stressed that the two countries favor preventing the spread of conflict and a policy of peace and stability in the region, thus encouraging dialogue and a peaceful course.

They agreed on closer cooperation in the future within the framework of the PFP [Partnership for Peace] and participation in joint exercises. They discussed problems regarding signing a concrete cooperation program between Albania and Hungary in the sphere of defense.

The Hungarian side expressed readiness to expand cooperation and render assistance in the field of logistics, military medicine, etc.

The Hungarian ambassador in Tirana, Mr. Ferenc Poka, was present at the talks.

Military Protocol Signed

LD2203202395 Tirana Radio Tirana in English 1900 GMT 22 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Protocol agreement on the results of talks between Hungarian military delegation, headed by Hungarian minister of defense and the presentatives [as heard] of the Albanian Ministry of Defense was signed today. The protocol agreement estimates that the relations between the two countries are developed in many sides. Seeing the possibilities of the further development of this cooperation, signed by the respective defense ministers, the concrete duties and directions of work are defined, also exchange of delegations and military teams for the aid that Hungary will offer to the Albanian Army in the field of logistics, [word indistinct] and education. Both ministers estimated the document and the need of its implementation into practice.

Paper Views Papoulias's 'Successful' Visit

AU2303124095 Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE in Albanian 15 Mar 95 p 1

[Unattributed editorial: "A Victory of Wisdom and Good Reason—The Aftermath of Mr. Papoulias's Visit to Tirana"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Greek Foreign Minister Papoulias left Tirana yesterday having held meetings with the highest officials of the Albanian state. The Albanian public followed with interest one of the most eagerly awaited and discussed visits ever made by a foreign head of the diplomatic corps to Albania. It can be said without any doubt that the successful outcome of the visit has created a general feeling of relief and realistic optimism among our general public. This was the second time that Mr. Papoulias has been received by the government. In both cases, he came to Tirana after severe crises and dangerous tensions in bilateral relations. However, in spite of the similarity in terms of our country's strained relations with our southern neighbor, these two visits differ from each other in a series of very important changes.

First, it can be justifiably claimed that there seems to be, in Athens, a much greater awareness of the risk that extremism represents in government policy, and a sense of the responsibility that Balkan governments should have for the fate of our peninsula's stability.

Second, the Greek Government has announced without hesitation and in a louder voice that it is officially distancing itself from extremists circles, which in the aftermath of the Cold War could not find [words indistinct].

Third, the international community—mainly the United States and the EU—have taken a distinctly impartial, mature, and obligingly constructive position. There was no [word indistinct] alignment, as might have been expected in Athens.

However, the greatest difference between Mr. Papoulias's two visits lies undoubtedly in their content. In November of 1993, Mr. Papoulias came with goodwill, but nothing more than that; in March of 1995, he left Tirana after producing a whole package of concrete proposals and having a series of important meetings. The main proposal was the acceptance in principle by Athens of Tirana's repeated proposal—reiterated by Berisha at the OSCE's Budapest summit in December of 1994—to conclude a friendship and cooperation treaty between

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the two countries, which also expressed Albania's readiness to start immediately, together with the Greek side, to work on a draft of such a treaty. This document would undoubtedly constitute a broader and much more solid basis for friendly Greco-Albanian relations than any political declarations, which are often subject to everyday developments in events. The impact of such a treaty would surpass the importance of a bilateral agreement, because normality and understanding between Albania and Greece is a great [word indistinct] to regional stability. Mr. Papoulias has taken it upon himself to find an acceptable solution to the rather delicate issue of recognizing the state borders, based on existing maps. Eliminating this point from the agenda of negotiations strengthened mutual trust and opened the way to resolving other pending issues. The inhabitants of Saranda and Permet will be very glad to learn that the road to Greece will soon pass via Qafe [word indistinct] and Tri Urat, respectively, creating a short cut to Greece and invigorating their local economy. Thus, with the opening of these new border crossings, the promise made by the PD [Democratic Party] to the people of these regions in the 1992 election campaign will be fulfilled. The Greek statesman promised that the Greek Government would seriously consider legalizing Albanian emigrants in Greece, boosting the quota of visas for Albanians, and creating facilities for paying Albanians through branches of Greek banks in Albania, and so on.

The Greek minister made a radical change as regards the Cam problem, giving the go-ahead for a judicial handling of the ownership problem of the Cam inhabitants ejected by force and terror from their homes after World War II. Even more spectacular—albeit thoroughly realistic—was his new policy toward the Greek minority in Albania. He expressed to President Berisha his pleasure over Albania's efforts and achievements in ensuring the rights of the Greek minority. There is no need to remind readers of the tone and language used by certain Greek circles regarding this issue last autumn.

Mr. Papoulias's March visit marks a substantial change in Athens' attitude towards Albania in the international arena. Whereas two or three months ago, in Brussels, the Greek Government vetoed EU aid and threatened to block our participation in the Partnership for Peace, today Mr. Papoulias publicly confirms that his government will support without reservations Albania's integration into Europe and the West, expressing his pleasure that the Albanian Army will take part in the joint military exercises that Greece is carrying out near Pireus together with the United States and other countries of the region.

Mr. Papoulias also confirmed to President Berisha his support for the idea of a Balkan foreign ministers' conference. The two sides also agreed that problems in bilateral relations should be overseen by a special commission headed by, for our side, Mr. Starova, and Mr. Georgiou, the general secretary of the Greek Foreign Ministry. This leads us to believe that the agreements concluded heretofore will not get stuck or lost in bureaucratic mechanisms but will be adequately monitored and translated into practice.

The Greek minister received President Berisha's assurances that the standards enjoyed by the Greek minority in Albania are dynamic and, like all other standards of Albanian democracy, are on the increase. The study of Greek will be introduced into middle schools in Dropul, while the government's private education law will benefit all the citizens of the Republic, including the minorities. What was listed above is [words indistinct] with our neighbors. By defusing disputes, encouraging good understanding, and opening the doors to Albania's economic development and its regional and European integration, we think that not only are we serving Albania's national interests but we are making a substantial contribution to Balkan cooperation. We also think that, apart from the leaders of the Albanian state, credit should go to the Greek foreign minister, whose Albanian account also contains another great achievement: the repealing of the law on war with Albania.

Expressing our best wishes for what was achieved yesterday, we stress again that only realism and political maturity are the real friends of the people and we sincerely hope that the Tirana agreement will mark a final turning point for the future of the southern Balkans.

Agenda for Visit

95P20625A Tirana REPUBLIKA in Albanian 5 Mar 95 pp 1-2

[Article by Zef F. Noli: "Before Papoulias Comes"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The upcoming visit [to Albania] of Greek Foreign Minister Karolos Papoulias is undoubtedly a special event in the relations between two longtime neighbors in the Balkans. However, the mere existence of a desire and good intentions on the part of the Meksi and Papandreu governments, often stated by the two sides, is not sufficient. An honest discussion and the resolution of the problems that exist between the two countries will be of special importance.

In connection with the problem of the Greek minority in Albania, Mr. Papoulias must be informed, in clear terms, of the position of the Albanian government that, while on the one hand there is a serious commitment to protect the rights of the Greek minority in accordance with international norms and Albanian legislation, on the other hand, the Greek minority will not be allowed to become prey to political manipulations—because if this happens, not only would the traditional links between the Albanian people and the Greek minority be hurt but also, there might be repercussions in the relations between the countries. In this regard, a recent example of what should not occur is the case of the five Albanian citizens of Greek origin who were found guilty by Albanian courts [in the Omonia case].

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In regard to the issue of the legalization of the status of Albanian emigres in Greece, the Albanian government should hail this reasonable and welcome move on the part of the Greek government. Greece should help Albania sincerely, without prejudices and without preconditions, to integrate rapidly into a united Europe. On the other hand, the Albanian government must also emphasize that it will not tolerate mistreatement and serious violations of the rights of Albanian citizens in Greece. The fact that quite a few Albanians are in Greece illegally does not justify the flagrant violations of their basic human rights. Not only are such instances, which occur frequently and repeatedly, detrimental to the traditional good relations between the two peoples but they are also very damaging to the international image of Greek democracy and are serious violations of international agreements on the protection of human rights that the Greek state has signed.

Another matter that Albanian diplomats have begun to raise is the issue of the Cam minority [ethnic Albanians expelled from their properties in Greece after World War II]. It should be impressed upon Mr. Papoulias that the Cam problem is not an issue thatis being raised only as a counterweight at a certain point in time. He must be told that the just resolution of the Cam problem is a priority issue for the foreign policy of the Republic of Albania.

It must be explained to the Greek side that the high ideals of humanism and the democratic spirit of the Greek people are factors that are useful in the efforts to correct an unpardonable historic injustice committed against an entire, innocent, indigenous population by malevolent and suspect elements.

On the other hand, the Albanian government must not hesitate one bit in demanding that the Greek government recognize and respect the rights connected with the historical, cultural and linguistic identity of the Albanians in Greece. The contribution of the Arvanitas [ethnic Albanians in Greece] heroes in establishing and strengthening the modern Greek state is an undeniable historical fact of which both our peoples are proud. However, no effort has been made by the Greek government to recognize the Arvanitasi as an ethnic entity within the Greek state and to allow them to freely study the age-old Albanian language and the culture and history of their motherland. Thus, just as the Arvanitasi were not sparing in shedding their blood in the War of Independence in Greece in 1821 and subsequently, today, too, they can give valuable assistance in the development of relations between the two countries.

But these are not the only obstacles existing between the two countries. Albania must make it clear to its neighbor to the south that, in its own economic development policy, Albania cannot be indifferent to the fact that some of the Greek investments in the south appear to be intended more for the political interests of Hellenization and territorial expansion than for real economic investment, especially since Greek laws do not permit the creation of commercial companies in which the majority of the capital would be controlled by non-Greek natural or legal persons. If Greece has anxieties in this regard, why wouldn't a smaller country such as Albania be on guard, and why wouldn't its anxieties be misunderstood.

Also, the Albanians who meet with Mr. Papoulias must be careful in another regard. This is the clever diplomat who was able to convince the former Albanian minister of foreign affairs, Mr. Kapllani, during their discussions in Corfu, to give the green light for the undesirable and temporary stay of professor Dr. Anastas Janullatos in Albania. In the meantime, the Greek state should not be allowed, under any circumstances, to interfere in matters related to the Albanian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, and it should be stressed to the Greek authorities that the implementation of the statute of the Albanian Autocephalous Orthodox Church will never become an "extreme instance" in relations between the two countries. On the contrary, this would be in full accordance with all the international agreements and domestic laws ensuring respect of the right of religious communities "to elect, appoint and replace their personnel in accordance with their respective regulations and norms and with any other freely accepted agreement between them and their state" (Principles 16 and 17 of the final Vienna document of the OSCE). It should also be explained to Mr. Papoulias that, just as we respect the age-old Greek traditions, history and culture, we ask the Greeks to respect our traditions, history and culture. We are all very sensitive, and we cannot forget the blood shed by murdered Albanian Orthodox clergymen and the curses levied against Albanians by the official Greek church, against the use of the Albanian language and the independent existence of the Albanian Orthodox Church.

In conclusion, the Albanian authorities must decisively ask for the cooperation of the Greek authorities in finding the perpetrators of the terrorist crime of 10 April 1994 [attack on the Peshkepi e Siperme military barracks near the Greek border]. While it appears that the Greek government's statements that it "has no responsibility" for this unprecedented act are to be believed, emphasis should be placed on gathering all the data and evidence that would lead to the discovery and sentencing of the perpetrators of this crime, whose tracks might even lead outside Greece.

While we hope that the Albanian political parties will not use Mr. Papoulias's visit to Tirana for domestic political purposes but, this time, be guided by the national interest, it remains to be seen how Greece will utilize this new opportunity to demonstrate to Europe the importance of its role in the pacification of the turbulent region of the Balkans.

Interior Minister on Reform Within Ministry

AU2203210495 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 21 Mar 95

[Report by Rajmonda Nelku]

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[FBIS Translated Text] Interior Minister Agron Musaraj gave a news conference today. One of the main goals of the democratic government's program was to establish public order. That is why this news conference aims to inform reporters about the implementation of the government's program in the sphere of establishing public order and civil security, Interior Minister Musaraj said when opening the news conference.

Minister Musaraj then gave a long briefing on the situation of public order and civil security at the time when the democratic government came to power. Stressing increasing efficiency in the work of the forces of public order and the Investigation Office as a main goal, Musaraj then gave figures. A total of 12,000 crimes were registered in 1990, 11,500 in 1991, approximately 12,600 in 1992, 9,253 in 1993, and 7,423 in 1994—figures that attest to a declining number of crimes, Musaraj said.

Discussing the restructuring of the ministry in accordance with the goal and tasks set for it by the Constitution, the minister pointed out that the creation of several new structures at the ministry—such as the investigation police, the organized crime department, and the antidrug units—and the restructuring of current directorates, boosts the efficiency of the fight against crime.

Talking about the implementation of reforms in the ministry, Musaraj said that honesty, devotion, professionalism, and depoliticization have been the basic criteria in implementing reform. In this regard, 80 percent of the staff have higher education and are new to the duty, with 10 percent of them coming from higher education.

Regarding the qualification of the staff as another goal, Musaraj mentioned figures that reveal the precedence given by the ministry to the qualification of students and officers in Western countries.

Another obligation of our ministry is to complete the judicial cadre, Musaraj said. We can assert that the Police now has the necessary cadres and is oriented to respect for the law.

Musaraj provided more information on bilateral agreements with the Council of Europe and other Western and East European countries in fulfilling the extent envisaged by the government as regards cooperation with neighboring and advanced countries in the fight against crime. He then listed some of the measures anticipated in the program but not realized to the necessary extent and in the appropriate way: cooperation with the Office of the Prosecutor and the Police Court; support for the police with equipment and technology; the improvement of the living conditions of police officers; their financial treatment; and greater efficiency in investigation and criminal police work.

Answering a correspondent's question on how he assessed the Greek Government's stance in arresting seven persons, members of a terrorist organization, seen in the focus of last April, the minister Musaraj stated that he assessed it as an important and primary step in strengthening Albanian-Greek relations.

Asked by a Chinese correspondent for his assessment of the acts that infringed on the security of Chinese businessmen in Albania, Musaraj said that this is serious, if such acts have occurred; stressed his concern; and suggested that the incidents should be reported to the Interior Ministry at the proper time.

'Terrorist Group' Reported Arrested in Greece

AU2203164095 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1430 GMT 22 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] It is reported that the Greek Government has recalled (Panajotis Midieris), an employee of the Greek Embassy in Tirana, who was found in possession of brochures that incited separatism among the Greek minority in Albania.

As is known, on Sunday the Greek police arrested seven persons, among whom were four Albanian nationals—Mario Kutulla, Harallamb Papa, Jorgo Kristo, and Koti Bejleri, who were preparing for an operation against a barracks in Llongos in Gjirokaster.

According to the Greek press, the Greek authorities were informed about this act by Albanian forces who detected the terrorist group on Saturday night.

The seven members of the group will be interrogated by a public prosecutor today.

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Russian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Visiting

AU2203202895 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 22 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] On 22 March, Foreign Minister Georgi Pirinski received Nikolay Afanasyevskiy, Russia's deputy minister of foreign affairs, who is visiting Bulgaria for political consultations.

Future steps related to preparing the visit of Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin to Bulgaria have been discussed. Opinions have been exchanged regarding the efforts to find a peaceful settlement to the situation in the former Yugoslavia, as well as regarding topical issues of cooperation with European and Euro-Atlantic structures.

Commentary: Bosnian-Croat Federation 'Stillborn'

AU2203211395 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 18 Mar 95 p 7

[Commentary by Ivaylo Georgiev: "State Without a State"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In Washington the first anniversary of something that does not exist was solemnly celebrated. President Clinton, who maintains a low profile during working visits by other foreign state and government leaders, this time granted 10 minutes of his time to the leaders of the so-called Bosnian Muslim-Croatian Federation, which the Bosnian Muslims and Croats both claim exists only on paper. The very fact that the meeting was attended by the president of this nonexistent federation, Croat Kresimir Zubak, and the president of Croatia itself, Franjo Tudjman, but was notable for the absence of Alija Izetbegovic, president of the still-existent State of Bosnia-Herzegovina, is enough to indicate that something was wrong with the Washington celebrations. Of course, Richard Holbrooke, the State Department's assistant secretary for European affairs, was quite right when, as the main speaker at the ceremony, he admitted that one year after its founding, the fragile federation needed something to bring it to life. Naturally, the professional diplomat was not permitted to say the truth: namely that the federation has turned out to be stillborn and, what's more is a war bastard, as the American journalists put it.

It is indeed strange how the Americans, the brokers of this unconsummated marriage, have managed to close their eyes and ears to glaring facts that deny the existence of the federation more convincingly than anything else. For example, on the very eve of the federation's first anniversary, as-yet-unidentified Muslim units kidnapped and have probably already killed Vlado Santic, the commander of the Bosnian Croat forces—which led to a complete suspension of relations between the Bosnian Croats and Muslims. To top it all off, the report came through that the leadership of the self-styled Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosna had introduced duties on all goods imported from and exported to Muslim Bosnia. Even before this, other bizarre news items appeared, such as the announcement in Zagreb that the Croats and Muslims were forming a joint military command, while on the very same day the people in Sarajevo denied that this was the case.

The big noise being raised in Washington is aimed at creating the impression that the only success that U.S. diplomacy has achieved to date on the territory of the former Yugoslavia—namely, the birth of the new federated state—has not suffered a fatal outcome. The truth is even more discrediting: For the time being at least, the event is a pure fiasco.

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Source Claims Detained Arms Shipped With Approval

AU2203190995 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 18 Mar 95 pp 1-2

[Article by Frantisek Nedudinsky: "Slovak Caliber 77 Medical Supplies at the Azores?"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Yesterday the TASR reported that a Russian Antonov 124/100 transport aircraft, known as Ruslan, was detained during an unscheduled stopover at the Lajes air base in the Azores on 16 March. According to the cargo documents, the plane was transporting medical supplies, but it was reportedly found to be carrying Slovak weapons to the Dominican Republic. [passage omitted]

Because each arms export from Slovakia is subject to approval by the interdepartmental Licensing Commission, which includes representatives of the Ministries of Economy, Defense, and Foreign Affairs, the State Defense Council, and others, we tried yesterday to contact at least one member of this commission to answer the following question: "Has the export of Slovak guns and artillery ammunition to the Dominican Republic passed through the Licensing Commission or not?"

Everything suggests that several members of the commission have recently been replaced.

The Defense Ministry said that the whole matter was being investigated. [passage omitted]

At the State Defense Council, they referred us to Engineer Zolak, from the Ministry of Economy, who is supposedly secretary of the Licensing Commission. But, according to Zolak's own statement, he does not execute the post of secretary and is not even a member of the commission. We were told to contact Engineer Ladislav Sandtner, director of the Licensing Section. He was at a meeting, but the secretarial staff at the Ministry of Economy referred us in the matter of the Licensing Commission for arms exports to Engineer Vladimir Pavlik, director of the Special Production Department, and Engineer Ivan Kovacik, director of the Engineering and Electrical Engineering Department. The directors were either absent or at meetings. [passage omitted]

In the afternoon, the TASR did eventually publish Eng. Kovacik's statement: "The Ministry of Economy has neither been asked to issue a license to export weapons to the Dominican Republic, nor has it issued any such license. A piece of misinformation is apparently involved, which, unfortunately, has already happened several times of late. Let me add for the sake of completeness that, in South America, only Haiti is subject to an arms trade embargo."

We add, for our part, that, according to our information, the Ministry of Economy does not have any Licensing Commission for arms exports. The commission that exists is an interdepartmental one, and the Ministry of Economy is only represented in it. Moreover, the permitted Dominican Republic is separated from the embargoed Haiti by only a very permeable border.

We therefore tried to supplement information from unofficial sources as well: "As far as I know, this consignment did pass through the Licensing Commission, but the whole case is pure as gold."

The above source of information is considered by us to be very reliable but, for understandable reasons, we do not intend to reveal his identity. [passage omitted]

[Bratislava SME in Slovak on 18 March on pages 1 and 2 carries a 600-word report by Jana Cevelova entitled "Russian Aircraft Carrying Allegedly Slovak Arms Detained at the Azores." The SME reporter says that she "managed to find out that an Antonov 124/100 did, indeed, take off from the General M.R. Stefanik Airport in Bratislava on 16 March at 0710. According to Engineer Igor Dula, director of the Slovak Airport Administration, a consignment of special equipment was loaded at Bratislava airport. 'We were presented with a license with all the necessary Slovak permits for export of special equipment. On this basis, the customs office cleared the cargo because the papers were okay. That which was listed in the customs declaration was loaded under the customs' supervision and the aircraft departed. They had the two formal requirements necessary to land, load cargo, and take off—the export permit and the flight permit,' Engineer Dula said."]

Destination Reportedly Ecuador

AU2203191095 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 21 Mar 95 pp 1-2

[Article by Frantisek Nedudinsky: "Crew of Ukrainian Aircraft Should Not Have Lied; Arms from Bratislava Were Transported Legally"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Bratislava—[Passage omitted] Engineer Ivan Kovacik, director of a Ministry of Economy department, was right when he declared that the ministry has neither been asked to issue any license to export weapons to the Dominican Republic, nor has it issued any such license, and when he complained that this was a piece of misinformation. [passage omitted] However, the only misinformation was that the weapons [detained by Portuguese customs during the stopover of a Ukrainian aircraft with Slovak weapons aboard at Azores on 16 March] were destined for the Dominican Republic. In reality, they were to be exported to another state. The fact that the export had been officially approved was confirmed by Engineer Igor Dula, director of the Slovak Airport Administration, in the 18 March issue of SME. [passage omitted]

The consignment would undoubtedly have reached the point of destination without problems had the Ukrainian

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crew not declared the goods on board as medical supplies. We have not managed to ascertain why it did so. [passage omitted]

Asked about the possible motives of the Ukrainian crew's naive lie, a foreign trade expert only shrugged his shoulders and said that he did not understand. The AN 124 in question belongs to a Ukrainian air carrier that was established by the Antonov aircraft design company, which developed this type of aircraft. [passage omitted] It had been chartered from Antonov by the foreign mediator of the sale of arms equipment from our arsenals to the Ecuadorean Ministry of Defense. It cannot be ruled out that the Antonov was chosen because it charged a lower price than other firms. Slovakia has thus become a subject of gossip even though, according to all known facts, all of the decisive mistakes were made outside the reach of Slovak authorities. Apparently, we have not fully appreciated the fact that sensitive operations, no matter how legal they may be, must be carried out with reliable partners. [passage omitted]

Yesterday we received the Slovak Defense Ministry's stand on the report we published about this affair on 18 March. Frantisek Kasicky, the ministry's press secretary, informed us that "the Ministry of Defense has two representatives in the interdepartmental Licensing Commission for arms exports—Colonel Vojtech Lampert, director of the Weaponry, Equipment, and Materials Office, and Major General Leopold Bilcik, director of the Logistics Department. Under its statutes, the Licensing Commission issues permits for arms exports, and it is fully within its jurisdiction to comment on its decisions." He added that, even had he not been out on business on 17 March, he would not have been able to provide us with any other standpoint.

General Outlines Military Agreement With Russia

AU2203212195 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 17 Mar 95 p 3

[Interview with Major General Leopold Bilcik, chief of the Slovak Defense Ministry's Logistics Section, by Pavol Vitko; place and date not given: "Spare Parts From Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Within the framework of the 13-16 March visit by a Russian delegation headed by Oleg Lobov, secretary of the Russian Federation Security Council, which met with the most important government and economic representatives of Slovakia, Major General Leopold Bilcik, chief of the Slovak Defense Ministry's Logistics Section, and his Russian counterpart, Colonel General Sitnov, Russian Ministry of Defense chief of armaments, signed two documents. We asked General Bilcik about their contents.

In the first document we agreed on a cooperation plan between the Slovak and Russian Defense Ministries for 1995. It contains 12 points; our side and Russia are each responsible for six of them. Individual points concern the exchanges of experts, the mutual exchange of information on modernization trends in armaments, and holiday exchanges of members of the two armies. The second document contains five basic points. These represent conclusions from mutual negotiations on armaments and possible future cooperation. They again deal, apart from other issues, with exchanges of information about development trends and the modernization of weaponry. They also confirm the already concluded protocol on the formation of a group of experts to assess the possibility of establishing a joint venture for aircraft repairs in Trencin. Our own as well as Russian military aircraft would be repaired there under mutually advantageous conditions, including by means of barter.

[Vitko] What kind of agreement was reached at the negotiations regarding the repayment of part of the Russian debt by means of military material?

[Bilcik] The documents that have been signed specify in greater detail how the repayment of this debt is to be made. We have formulated our demands with greater precision. We will receive spare parts and some special types of lubricants and fuels that we cannot obtain by other means to a total value of approximately $8.5 million. We expect delivery of those materials by the end of this year.

[Vitko] Will the repayment of the Russian debt with military materials continue in the future?

[Bilcik] We do not have the funds to purchase new equipment. If we want to continue operating the equipment we own and maintain it in combat-ready condition, it will continue to be our endeavor to receive spare parts from the Russian Federation and to write this off from the debt account.

Lithuanian Defense Secretary Discusses Cooperation

AU2203212395 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 17 Mar 95 p 2

[Article by "pv": "They Do Not Want Arms From the East"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Colonel Jonas Gecas, secretary at the Ministry of National Defense of the Lithuanian Republic, concluded a two-day visit to the Slovak Republic with talks at the Defense and Economics Ministries yesterday.

The most important outcome of this first official meeting between officials of the two countries' Ministries of Defense, Jonas Gecas and his counterpart, Jozef Gajdos, state secretary at the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, is a plan of military contacts for 1995-96 and an agreement to hold a meeting of expert groups to specify the possibilities for mutual cooperation.

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The Lithuanian Armed Forces consist at present of 8,000 soldiers and 12,000 members of the National Guard. Because, following the withdrawal of the former Soviet Army, Lithuanian barracks have remained virtually empty, we asked Jonas Gecas where his army would be purchasing equipment and weaponry. "We want to purchase certain types of weapons and are guided by three priorities. The first is quality and technical and tactical specifications. Another very important criterion is price. The third priority is the political interests of our state. While we favor a reasonable balance between these criteria, if both the price and the quality of weapons conformed to our ideas but the purchase were not advantageous in terms of Lithuania's integration into Western security structures, the third priority would prevail. When purchasing arms, weaponry, and military equipment, we will therefore be looking mostly west and southwest," he replied.

Sitek To Visit Military Exhibition in UAE

AU2303082995 Bratislava SMENA in Slovak 18 Mar 95 p 2

[TASR report in the "Day at Home" column]

[FBIS Translated Text] Defense Minister Jan Sitek departed for a five-day visit to the United Arab Emirates [UAE]. He will visit, among other things, the IDEX 1995 exhibition of special military equipment in the UAE capital of Abu Dhabi. Slovak military production, particularly modernized weapon systems, and the results of military technical development in the Army of the Slovak Republic will be presented within the framework of the exhibition.

Businesses Set Up Group To Cooperate With Iraq

AU2303080695 Bratislava SMENA in Slovak 20 March 95 p 4

[Article by "sm": "When the Embargo Ends"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The constituent meeting of the Society for Slovak-Iraqi Cooperation was held in Bratislava late last week. Its founders are representatives of important Slovak business circles who realize that the embargo imposed on Iraq will not last forever and that everything must be done for economic cooperation between the two countries to start as soon as the embargo is lifted. Similar steps are being taken also in other countries. The society's declared aim is to awaken and nurture ideas of mutual knowledge and understanding between the two nations through the active promotion of civic, social, educational, and cultural contacts. The society's members elected a five-member committee, which is chaired by the journalist [and SMENA deputy chief editor] Boris Latta.

Kovac Views Concern About Freedom of Information

AU2203212295 Bratislava SME in Slovak 11 Mar 95 pp 1, 7

[Article by Lubomir Lintner: "President of the Slovak Republic Leaves for Copenhagen Conference"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Bratislava/Copenhagen—[Passage omitted] In an interview for SME, Slovak Radio, and TASR before his departure for Copenhagen, Slovak President Michal Kovac stressed that, while in Copenhagen, he wanted to express satisfaction that the advanced countries of the world are beginning to realize that their own continued prosperity depends on their ability to halt the deepening social abyss among individual regions. Asked by SME about possible questions on the domestic political situation in Slovakia from the leading representatives of individual countries attending the conference, in connection with the government's attitude toward financing the Office of the President and its steps and considerations in the mass media, which send a certain signal abroad about domestic political developments, Kovac said that he had just been studying information from Slovak ambassadors in Bonn, Brussels, Paris, and London, confirming that these steps are creating responses abroad. He continued by saying, "Personally, I am not dramatizing the situation, but I am not underestimating it, either. Some matters are of such a nature that it will be necessary to carry out certain changes, certain corrective steps. However, I want to assure the countries' representatives that our public is very sensitive to various attempts that could lead to restrictions of the freedom of information and we—the government coalition, the opposition, and civic associations—have enough power to prevent some possibly ill-considered measures geared toward restricting the freedom of information." Asked by SME about questions that might be raised about the cut to the budget of the Office of the President, he said, "I will find it very difficult to explain this because all of the EU countries attribute great importance to the role of the president of the Slovak Republic within the system of constitutional institutions and protection of democracy. This is being emphasized by representatives of all of the delegations visiting Slovakia. It is incomprehensible to them that an institution they consider to be very significant has found itself in a situation of severe budgetary restrictions. I will try to assure all of them that, in defiance of this, my remaining colleagues and I, personally, are determined to exert maximum efforts to prevent this situation from resulting in reduced activity of the president of the Republic, both internationally and internally."

Hungarian Civic Party Elects 4 Deputy Chairmen

AU2303081295 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 20 Mar 95 p 2

[Article by "da": "Severe Criticism of the Coalition"]

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[FBIS Translated Text] Komarno—The Fourth Assembly of the Hungarian Civic Party (MOS) ended in Komarno shortly before midnight on 18 March. The assembly confirmed the party's political orientation and approved some changes in its basic documents. MOS Chairman Laszlo A. Nagy subjected the policies of the present government coalition to severe criticism: "Slovakia today has a government and a parliamentary majority, in which right-wing and left-wing extremes are present to the same degree and whose core is made up of a political force that could never take pride in its consistency and firm spine. It seemingly acts as a sovereign political force, but, in reality, it is slave to its petty and wretched power ambitions." Referring to the basic treaty between the Hungarian Republic and the Slovak Republic, he stressed that its aim should be to improve relations between the two states at all levels. If it is not capable of fulfilling this aim, there is not much sense to it. The almost 400 delegates reelected Laszlo A. Nagy as party chairman. Laszlo Gyurovszky, Jozsef Solymos, Bela Angyal, and Peter Voros became deputy chairmen.

Hungarian Leader: Treaty Chance for Better Ties

LD2203205395 Bratislava Slovak Radio Network in Hungarian 1400 GMT 22 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Hungarian-Slovak Treaty offers a chance for improving relations between Slovakia and Hungary. This was stated by Pal Csaky, deputy chairman of the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement, at the party's press briefing today.

Bela Bugar, chairman of the movement, spoke about the various possible interpretations of the treaty. He said that the text should be translated into English, which should then be accepted by both sides. It would make perfectly clear what goals are being pursued by the contracting sides at the time of signing.

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Text of Hungarian-Slovak Basic Treaty

95CH0195A Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 20 Mar 95 p 4

["Text" of Hungarian-Slovak basic treaty, signed by Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn and Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar in Paris on 19 March 1995: "Treaty Between the Hungarian Republic and the Slovak Republic on Good-Neighbor Relations and Friendly Cooperation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Convinced that the historic changes that have taken place in Europe as well as in the Republic of Hungary and the Republic of Slovakia [hereinafter: Parties to the Treaty] provide unique opportunities for performing certain joint tasks which flow from the development of bilateral good-neighbor relations in the spirit of friendly cooperation;

And endeavoring to contribute to the structuring of Europe as the continent of peace, security, and prosperity in the framework of ongoing integration processes;

And affirming that respect for and enforcement of the principles of human rights and fundamental civil rights, democracy, constitutional statehood, and humanism constitute the foundations of freedom, justice, and peace;

And recognizing that persons belonging to national minorities constitute integral parts of the society and state of the Party to the Treaty in whose territory they reside, and that such persons also contribute to the enrichment of these societies and states and to the deepening of confidence, friendship, and cooperation between the respective countries, and declaring a sense of responsibility for defending and advancing the preservation and deepening of the national or ethnic, cultural, religious, and linguistic identity of minorities residing within the respective territories;

And affirming that the Parties to the Treaty are guided by the principles contained in the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Closing Accord of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Paris Charter of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe concerning A New Europe, as well as in further documents adopted by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE];

And convinced that the further development of mutual friendly relations and cooperation on new foundations is consistent with the existential interests of the countries and nations of the Parties to the Treaty, the Parties to the Treaty have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The Parties to the Treaty will develop mutual relations like good neighbors in the spirit of confidence and friendly cooperation, and will conduct dialog in every field of mutual interest.

Article 2

In their mutual relations, just as in their relations with other states, the Parties to the Treaty will respect the general principles and standards observed under international law, and primarily the principles and standards adopted in the framework of the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Accord, and the Paris Charter concerning A New Europe, as well as the principles contained in other documents adopted in the framework of the OSCE.

Article 3

(1) Consistent with the basic principles and standards of international law, the Parties to the Treaty affirm their respect for the inviolability of their common state border and each other's territorial integrity. The Parties to the Treaty affirm that they have no territorial claims against each other and that such claims will not be made in the future.

(2) Each Party to the Treaty declares that in mutual relations it will refrain from using force or the threat of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of the other Party, or from taking or supporting other such action contrary to the United Nations Charter or international law, and from enabling a third party to use its territory for similar actions against the other Party. Disputed issues arising between the Parties to the Treaty will be resolved exclusively by peaceful means.

Article 4

(1) If in the opinion of one of the Parties to the Treaty a situation that has evolved in international relations could threaten international peace and security or the Party's own security interests, one Party may request consultation with the other Party to examine what could be done to lessen or liquidate the tension consistent with principles contained in the United Nations Charter and applied in the framework of the OSCE.

(2) The Parties to the Treaty will hold regularly scheduled consultations at various levels regarding security and defense issues of mutual interest. At the request of either Party, the Parties to the Treaty will inform each other of the fulfillment of international obligations pertaining to security and disarmament. The military aspects of the bilateral relations of the Parties to the Treaty will be governed by a separate agreement.

Article 5

(1) The Parties to the Treaty will establish an appropriate cooperative framework to realize the objectives of this Treaty in every field of mutual interest.

(2) The Parties to the Treaty attribute outstanding significance to the further development of relations and cooperation between legislative and executive organs.

(3) The Parties to the Treaty will conduct regularly scheduled consultations at various levels to further

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develop and deepen their bilateral relations and to familiarize each other with their respective positions on international issues. As part of such consultations, the prime ministers of the two countries will meet at least once a year, and the foreign ministers of the two countries will also review the implementation of the Treaty at least once a year.

(4) Cooperation between other branches, including regularly scheduled meetings of the leaders of such branches, will be pursued as agreed upon by these branches.

Article 6

The Parties to the Treaty affirm that their interests and endeavors are identical regarding their integration with the European Union [EU], the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the West European Union, and further, regarding the Council of Europe and the OSCE, and express their determination to support each other in this regard.

Article 7

(1) In the framework of their evolving bilateral relations and in the course of their integration with the EU, the Parties to the Treaty will develop mutually advantageous economic cooperation, primarily involving industry, agriculture, commerce, traffic, transportation, telecommunications, and service provisions.

(2) The Parties to the Treaty will establish conditions for the development of various forms of economic cooperation in the border areas and at the regional and local levels, including cooperation between natural persons and legal entities.

(3) The Parties to the Treaty recognize the importance of cooperation between higher-level self-governing bodies, cities, and villages, consistent with their designated scopes of authority and applying the principle of subsidiarity [szubszidiaritas].

Article 8

The Parties to the Treaty support scientific and technical cooperation. Regarding basic and applied research, they support the establishment of conditions needed for effective cooperation, particularly in regard to modern techniques and technologies, and support direct relations between, and joint initiatives, by scientists, as well as by the scientific and research institutions of the two countries.

Article 9

(1) Guided by interests related to caring for the natural environment and to preserving acceptable living conditions for future generations, the Parties to the Treaty will cooperate in protecting nature and the environment, in order to prevent and reduce environmental pollution, and, within that, especially the kind of pollution that could spread across the state border.

(2) Consistent with applicable agreements, and, foremost of all, in cooperation with the EU and its member states, the Parties to the Treaty will cooperate in protecting the environment and will participate in the formulation and implementation of the Union's environmental protection concept and concerted international strategy.

(3) The Parties to the Treaty will consummate a separate agreement at the governmental level regarding the adoption of specific measures aiming for increased environmental protection. Such agreements will provide for cooperation to reduce the risks of accidents, for an early warning system regarding accidents that have already taken place [as published], and the mitigation of the consequences of accidents.

Article 10

(1) By utilizing the most advanced technology, the Parties to the Treaty will expand mutual cooperation in the fields of air, rail, public road, inland waterway, ocean, pipeline, and combined forms of transportation, and in the infrastructure development of the postal service and telecommunication service provisions.

(2) The Parties to the Treaty affirm the right of landlocked states to have access to seas and to the related freedom of transit, and are prepared to cooperate with other states in this regard.

Article 11

Consistent with the development of diverse cooperative efforts, the Parties to the Treaty are prepared to improve opportunities for crossing the border, including the opening of new border-crossing points, as found feasible and necessary by both Parties to the Treaty.

Article 12

(1) The Parties to the Treaty will enhance cooperation in the fields of culture, the sciences, and education.

(2) The Parties to the Treaty regard cooperation based on mutual needs and interest expressed by individuals, or by groups established in response to initiatives advanced by institutions, organizations, associations, federations, settlements, local governments, and citizens, as the fundamental form of cultural, scientific, and educational cooperation between their countries. Based on appropriate agreements and programs, the Parties to the Treaty support initiatives by state, social, and private institutions, organizations, associations, and natural persons for mutual acquaintance and approach.

(3) The Parties to the Treaty support cooperation among educational and cultural institutions, as well as the exchange of elementary, high school, university and college students, teachers, and scientific workers.

(4) The Parties to the Treaty will facilitate scientific research in archives, libraries, museums, and institutions of similar character within their respective territories, including access to materials found in these institutions.

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(5) Based on appropriate agreements and pursuant to the internal laws of the other Party to the Treaty, each Party will recognize appropriately completed documents attesting to educational achievements and professional training, as well as scientific degrees issued in the state of the other Party.

(6) The Parties to the Treaty support the teaching of the language of the other state in schools as well as in institutions not of an educational character. For this purpose they will provide mutual assistance regarding the preparation of teachers in their native tongue and their continued education.

(7) The Parties to the Treaty endeavor to expand in their respective institutions of higher education knowledge about the culture, literature, and language of the other Party, as well as opportunities for Hungarian and Slovak studies.

(8) The Parties to the Treaty will establish conditions in their respective countries for activities in cultural centers, based on a mutual agreement.

Article 13

(1) Each Party to the Treaty will endeavor to preserve the other Party's historical and cultural relics and memorial sites where these are located.

(2) The Parties to the Treaty will exchange cultural values and archival materials based on agreements between the ministries having jurisdiction.

Article 14

The Parties to the Treaty will strengthen an atmosphere of tolerance and understanding in their respective countries between citizens of different ethnic, religious, cultural or linguistic origins. Consistent with obligations under international law, the Parties to the Treaty will provide within their respective territories identical and effective protection under law to all persons, irrespective of their race, color, gender, language, their religious, political or other conviction, or their nationality or social origin.

Article 15

(1) The Parties to the Treaty affirm that the protection of national minorities as well as the rights and civil rights of persons belonging to such national minorities constitutes an organic part of the international effort to protect human rights; that as such, protection of national minorities and their rights falls within the framework of international cooperation; that in this sense the protection of minorities and their interests is not an exclusive internal affair of a state; and that therefore the protection of national minorities is also a matter deserving the appropriate attention of the international community. The Parties to the Treaty acknowledge that cooperation in this field contributes to the good-neighbor relations of their countries, to the strengthening of mutual understanding, friendship, and confidence; and, at the same time, solidifies European integration as well as international security and stability.

(2) The Parties to the Treaty are guided by the following principles regarding the protection of national minorities and the rights related to persons belonging to such national minorities:

(a) Belonging to a national minority is based on the free choice of every person, and no person suffers any disadvantage based on this choice.

(b) Persons belonging to a national minority have a right to be equal and to enjoy equal protection under law. In this regard, any discrimination based on belonging to a national minority is prohibited.

(c) Persons belonging to a national minority have an individual and joint right with other members of their group to freely declare, preserve, and develop their ethnic, cultural, linguistic, or religious identity, and to preserve and develop every aspect of their culture.

(d) In affirming the goals of their own integrationist policies, the Parties to the Treaty will refrain from pursuing policies or practices aiming for the assimilation of persons belonging to minorities against their will, and will protect such persons from any act aiming for such assimilation. The Parties to the Treaty will refrain from taking actions that would change the population ratio in areas inhabited by persons belonging to national minorities and that would restrict the rights and civil rights of such persons to the detriment of national minorities.

(e) Persons belonging to national minorities have a right to establish and operate within an appropriate legal framework their own organizations and associations, including political parties, as well as educational, cultural and religious institutions to foster, develop, and transfer their identities. The two governments will provide appropriate legal conditions to accomplish this.

(f) Persons belonging to national minorities have a right to effectively participate in national, or, where appropriate, in regional decisions affecting the minorities to which they belong or the region in which they live, in a manner not conflicting with the internal legal system.

(g) Persons belonging to the Slovak minority in the Hungarian Republic and to the Hungarian minority in the Slovak Republic have an individual right, or, as a group, a joint right to freely use their native languages verbally and in writing in both private and public life. Further, in a manner consistent with the internal legal system and with international commitments agreed to by the two Parties to the Treaty, such persons or groups have a right to use their native languages in their official contacts, including government administrative and court proceedings; to have native language signs designating the settlements in which they reside, street names and the names of other public places, topographical data,

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inscriptions, and information regarding public areas; to record and use first and last names in these languages; to have an adequate opportunity in the framework of the state educational system to teach their native languages and to teach in their native languages—without infringing upon the teaching of, or teaching in the official language—and likewise, such persons and groups have a right to access the means of public mass communications without discrimination, and to have their own means of mass communications. Consistent with international commitments made, the Parties to the Treaties will create all legal, administrative, and other provisions needed to enforce the rights enumerated above, if such rules are not already contained in their legal systems.

(h) Consistent with Subsection (c) of this Section, the Parties to the Treaty will establish the necessary conditions for persons belonging to national minorities to preserve material and architectural relics and memorial sites which convey their cultural heritage, history, and traditions.

(3) The Parties to the Treaty agree that as citizens, persons belonging to national minorities have rights and duties identical to those of other citizens of the state.

(4) The Parties to the Treaty

(a) declare that in regulating the rights and duties of persons belonging to national minorities within their respective territories, they will apply the Basic Agreement concerning the protection of national minorities adopted by the Council of Europe and signed by the Parties to the Treaty on 1 February 1995, unless the internal legal systems of the Parties already contain provisions regarding the rights of persons belonging to minorities that are more favorable than those contained in the Basic Agreement; these provisions will be applied beginning on the day when this Treaty and the above-mentioned Basic Agreement are ratified by the Parties to the Treaty;

(b) will apply the standards and political commitments contained in the following documents to protect the Slovak minority residing in the Hungarian Republic and the Hungarian minority residing in the Slovak Republic, without impinging on the provisions of the preceding Subsection (a):

—The document issued at the Copenhagen meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe concerning the human dimension, dated 29 June 1990;

—United Nations General Assembly declaration No. 135/47 concerning the rights of persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities;

—Recommendation No. 1201 (1993) of the Council of Europe General Meeting, holding in respect individual human and citizen rights, including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities.

(5) Nothing in this Article shall be interpreted as an authorization to pursue an activity or to take action contrary to the fundamental principles of international law, and in particular, contrary to the sovereign equality, territorial integrity, and political independence of states.

(6) As part of mutual cooperation, the Parties to the Treaty will facilitate each other's ability to observe the implementation of the provisions of this Article. For this purpose the Parties to the Treaty will consider methods by which information and experience regarding the application of this Article can be exchanged in the framework of mutual cooperation pursuant to Article 5, Section (1) of this Treaty, and in the spirit of mutual understanding and confidence. The Parties to this Treaty will establish a joint advisory committee composed of such sections as deemed necessary by the Parties to the Treaty. In verifying the performance of obligations to protect national minorities, the Parties to the Treaty will proceed pursuant to rules promulgated by the Council of Europe and the OSCE, which are binding with respect to both Parties to the Treaty.

Article 16

(1) The Parties to the Treaty support multifaceted cooperation in the fields of public health, hygiene, and pharmaceutical research, primarily as part of the struggle to prevent and overcome contagious diseases and diseases that flow from our culture [civilizacios ... betegsegek].

(2) The Parties to the Treaty will develop cooperation in the field of social security and social care; the competent organs of the Parties to the Treaty may enter into appropriate agreements for this purpose.

Article 17

(1) Based on appropriate agreements, the Parties to the Treaty will cooperate in regard to legal and consular relations, as well as to police activities.

(2) The Parties to the Treaty will develop cooperation in the struggle against organized crime, particularly with respect to terrorism, narcotics abuse, and air piracy, as well as to the illegal export of objects and valuables having cultural, historical, and museum-quality significance.

Article 18

The Parties to the Treaty regard cooperation between the mass media as important and support the free exchange of information, and all endeavors to provide objective information that promote mutual familiarity and understanding.

Article 19

The Parties to the Treaty support the broadening of relations between political and social organizations,

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trade unions, churches, religious and other organizations, as well as between youth, sport, and other associations.

Article 20

This Treaty is not aimed against any third state and does not affect the rights and duties of the Parties to the Treaty based on other bilateral and multilateral treaties.

Article 21

(1) Parties to the Treaty will hold mutual consultations pursuant to the provisions of Article 5 of this Treaty concerning disagreements on the interpretation or application of this Treaty.

(2) In the event that consultations fail to eliminate disagreements within a reasonable period of time, the Parties to the Treaty will consider various methods consistent with the principles and standards of international law to eliminate the disagreements.

Article 22

(1) This Treaty is entered into for a 10-year period. If neither Party to the Treaty provides written notice to the contrary at least one year prior to the expiration of this Treaty, the term of the Treaty shall always be extended for five additional years.

(2) This Treaty is subject to ratification, and the Treaty takes force on the day when the ratified documents are exchanged.

(3) The Parties to the Treaty will register this Treaty pursuant to Article 102 of the United Nations Charter.

Dated in [blank] on [blank] March 1995 in two copies, each copy in both the Hungarian and the Slovak languages, the texts in both languages having equal force.

For the Hungarian Republic
For the Slovak Republic

Kovacs Views Slovak, Romanian, EU Relations

AU2203144895 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 11 Mar 95 p 8

[Interview with Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs by Dezso Pinter; place and date not given: "The Domestic Background Certifies the Foreign Policy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Pinter] Recent international political statements have again confirmed that the uniform Europe will not accept the quarrels between states in the eastern and central European region. Taking these statements into consideration, in your view, what role could the Hungarian-Slovak and Hungarian-Romanian basic treaties play?

[Kovacs] We must finally face the fact that without settling these discords in a European way, neither Hungary nor its neighbors can make it into the EU or NATO. However, in urging an improvement in relations, Hungary does not want only to fulfill the requirements of European integration. Hungarian-Slovak and Hungarian-Romanian relations directly affect the stability of Central Europe and, therefore, we have security interests in improving these relations. It is also clear that we have no chances of accelerating our economic cooperation without an adequate level of confidence and political relations. And another very important factor is that Hungary can hardly do anything for the benefit of the ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia and Romania if its relations with these two states are inadequate.

It is a fact that Romania and Slovakia regard the basic agreement as a starting point for improving bilateral relations. If we rejected the basic treaties, we would essentially be excluding the possibility of favorable processes starting, in our bilateral relations. Nor can we disregard the fact that Slovakia and Romania think it is essential to stipulate the inviolability of borders and the exclusion of territorial demands in the basic treaties. Contrary to certain opposition statements, accepting these demands would not harm Hungary's interests, because Hungary has already committed itself to all this by signing peace treaties, the final Helsinki document, and the Paris Charter, and we do not have any contrary aims. Nor would any such aim be realistic today. However, we are sticking to our demand that the basic treaties stipulate and guarantee national minority rights in accordance with European norms and as an internal right stipulated by international documents, so that these national minorities can preserve and even enrich their national, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and religious identities.

[Pinter] According to the conclusions of international forums such as the United Nations, the Council of Europe, and the OSCE, these two countries also periodically violate the rights of the ethnic Hungarian minorities there. What can guarantee that this will not happen again after the signing of the basic treaties?

[Kovacs] When a country accepts a document on national minority rights of the United Nations, the OSCE, or the Council of Europe, it is only making a political commitment—not an obligation in the legal sense of the word. Bilateral inter-State agreements are different, because these imply international legal obligations. In other words, if the basic treaty "only" repeats the formulations of international documents and contains the obligation accepted by the two sides to apply these formulations as rights, this provides considerable guarantees to the national minorities. Therefore, the basic treaties that the Hungarian Government intends to sign would not contradict the interests of the ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia and Romania. On the contrary: they would precisely serve to assert these interests.

[Pinter] What international pressure is being applied to the Hungarian Government to sign the basic treaties?

[Kovacs] Contrary to often-voiced statements, there is no unilateral pressure being exercised on Hungary. Of

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course, the EU and NATO have made it clear that the Euro-Atlantic alliance does not want to import the tensions prevailing among the states in the eastern and central European region. They are confronting the Hungarian and the Slovak and Romanian Governments with this demand and suggest that, if possible, we should sign the basic treaties even before the European Stability Conference to be held in Paris on 20 March. Of course, it is obvious that the Hungarian Government can only be asked to show its own readiness to come to an agreement, and not the willingness of its partners. We will continue to negotiate even if, for reasons outside Hungary, the basic treaties are not signed by 20 March. Europe will also welcome these documents later.

[Pinter] What is at stake for Hungary at the Paris conference?

[Kovacs] If we succeed in signing the two basic treaties, they will also be incorporated into the system of agreements on European stability, a system that contains the bilateral agreements, basic treaties, and national minority protection agreements of the regions involved in this process, namely Central Europe and the Baltics. This would increase the weight of these documents and also represent an important international political guarantee.

[Pinter] According to opinions from the opposition, mainly on the basis of statements made in the parliament's foreign policy debate, there is a difference between the position of the prime minister and your position regarding the primacy of joining European integration. What is your opinion about this?

[Kovacs] This view is totally unfounded. In the debate, I said that three main directions are closely connected in Hungarian foreign policy: Hungary's integration into the Euro-Atlantic community, the settling of relations with all our neighbors, and supporting ethnic Hungarians living beyond our borders so that their national minority rights are recognized and adequately guaranteed. In his speech, the prime minister did not refer to the foreign policy priority list; instead, he stressed that the domestic economic-social modernization should be subordinate to our integration endeavors. There is no integration without modernization and modernization is unimaginable without integration. Probably because they lack a uniform European image, certain prominent opposition politicians find it hard to understand that these three elements of Hungarian foreign policy are closely related and that it is impossible to assert them by making them confront one another.

[Pinter] How do you evaluate the balance of the foreign policy debate and the increasingly fierce debate over these basic treaties?

[Kovacs] I would like to point out first of all that I understand the concern of the ethnic Hungarian minorities living beyond our borders. Unfortunately, their situation justifies their fear of the future. However, their lack of confidence regarding the basic treaties mainly derives from the campaign that certain Hungarian politicians have been conducting since the election campaign. Following party policy interests, these politicians are frightening the ethnic Hungarians living abroad into believing that the Hungarian Government will sacrifice them on the altar of European integration. Some people are already speaking of a new Trianon. In this situation, the government must repeatedly make it clear that it will only sign a basic treaty that is in harmony with this country's interests and with the interests of the ethnic Hungarians living beyond Hungary's borders, one that provides the maximum attainable guarantees for the implementation of national minority rights, one that will improve the situation of the ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia and Romania. At the same time, it must be pointed out that setting unrealistic goals can only cause damage. Hindering the signing of basic treaties would harm both Hungary and the ethnic Hungarians living abroad.

It also transpired from the debate that the opposition parties do not have a coherent European policy. They do not understand, or they do not want to understand, that only the gradual integration of this whole region and membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions can guarantee the prosperity of Hungary and Hungarians. The identity crisis of the increasingly right-wing Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ], which has been tangible for more than a year, has destroyed the really high-level European concept that the FIDESZ was the first to formulate at the time. The Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] has learned nothing from the failure of its neighborhood and minority policy in the four years of its government. Those who derive a special pleasure in bringing up historical examples might also ponder about the effects of European integration on the centuries-old Franco-German rivalry. I am convinced that the historic opportunity currently being given Hungary and the Hungarians demands a great sense of responsibility and reality from every political force.

[Pinter] With the approach of National Day on 15 March, it may be important to quote the opinion formulated in France that Hungary could win everything that it lost during its revolutions by the turn of the century, and it could lose everything that it has accumulated over the course of centuries. What is your opinion about this?

[Kovacs] I do not think we can lose everything. But we could definitely miss an historic chance finally to integrate with the more developed part of Europe. A small country must move in the world very carefully: At every step, Hungary must thoroughly consider the realities and the international conditions. It must place its own interests within these conditions and must choose the most suitable methods of implementing these interests by adjusting to these conditions. It is crucial to decide whether we start from myths, dreams, and desires, or from reality, in planning our steps.

[Pinter] In other words, foreign policy has a decisive responsibility.

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[Kovacs] Internal relations cannot be separated from foreign policy, because the major task of the latter is to obtain foreign resources and support for domestic development. At the same time, the scope of foreign policy is not determined by the international situation alone. It can only take a genuine step if its domestic background is firm. If we want to make use of this historic opportunity, we must create a Hungary that conforms to Europe by the end of the century, complete with a modern economic structure and adequate social and welfare conditions, so that we can adjust to the Euro-Atlantic alliance, the EU, and NATO.

[Pinter] In your view, is the world taking into consideration the big stakes of Hungary's integration into Europe?

[Kovacs] The Euro-Atlantic states do not evaluate the importance of Hungary's membership according to our point of view: They do so according to theirs, which is natural. I do not have any illusions. No one will make unilateral gestures to Hungary. Everyone acts according to his interests. Will the Euro-Atlantic community realize that the Europe that is approaching the turn of the century has again reached a crossroads?

An economic, social, and welfare iron curtain—rather than a political and military one—can emerge in Europe now, with a secure, stable, and flourishing Europe on one side, and an unpredictable East and Central Europe stumbling from one crisis to another and eventually threatening the stability of West Europe on the other. There is also another possibility: a uniform, secure, and balanced, developing Europe. To achieve this, however, the spread of Euro-Atlantic integration eastward and the broadening of the EU and NATO are inevitable.

[Pinter] For the time being at least, it seems that the EU and the NATO member countries are not equally interested in this. What are the most protected interests?

[Kovacs] The five big member states of the EU think that the number of small countries in the EU is too high as it is and, with the exception of Poland, the states awaiting acceptance would also increase the camp of "small" states. As a result of the differences between certain interests of bigger and smaller countries, this would probably limit the scope of the big ones. The countries that pay more into the various funds of the alliance than they withdraw naturally fear that the relatively undeveloped small countries will increase their burden. As for the countries that have received considerable support from the EU funds for the development of their national economies in recent years, they justifiably fear that they will get less after the new states join the organization.

All the EU members are concerned over whether the current system of institutions will be able to guarantee the efficient operation of a broadened union. This requires basic institutional reforms. It is also clear that that the common agricultural policy, which emerged after big debates, cannot be continued in its present form.

While the EU primarily examines the effects that the joining of a new state would have on the internal conditions within the Union, NATO also examines the effects of the new members on foreign affairs—that is, the reaction of states who do not make it into NATO in the first phase and of those that remain outside for a long time. In this respect, Russia is being treated with special attention. In order to guarantee efficient operations, the EU has formulated comprehensive requirements for states awaiting acceptance that represent a serious economic and social challenge for these states. NATO's requirements apply to a narrower area than this and can be fulfilled slightly more easily. Taking all this into consideration, I think that Hungary can have a greater effect on the date of its acceptance into the EU than on that of its acceptance into NATO. NATO membership depends much more on external factors and the evaluation of external circumstances than does EU membership.

[Pinter] To what extent do you regard as correct the recently formulated view in Hungary that NATO membership is very close?

[Kovacs] This belief is based on the decision of NATO's Foreign Ministers Council on 1 December 1994 to examine thoroughly the conditions and consequences of expansion in 1995. The first version of this analysis will be ready soon and will be submitted to member states for debate. The other version, which will be submitted for debate to the more than 20 countries participating in NATO's Partnership for Peace program, will be ready in early autumn. Thus, it will become clear by the end of this year what requirements there will be for the expansion, and what consequences they must take into account. Therefore, NATO will be able to make a concrete decision on expansion at the beginning of 1996.

[Pinter] What countries could be affected by this?

[Kovacs] NATO has several possibilities. For example, they could start the expansion with countries that are strategically important; as a result, these countries' NATO membership would affect Russia's sensitivities. Another possible version: NATO would start expanding with countries of lesser strategic importance, thus gradually making Russia accept the idea of broadening the organization.

[Pinter] Which countries belong to the former group and which to the latter?

[Kovacs] For NATO and Russia, Poland is a strategically important state, while Hungary, which does not even border Russia, is among the less important ones.

[Pinter] In your view, to what extent do Hungarian politics and the public have a uniform view of the need for Hungary's membership in NATO and in the EU?
[Kovacs] The parliamentary parties agree on Hungary's need to join the EU as soon as possible and this also has the agreement of a broad circle in our society. There is a

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difference between politics and the public in that, given their situation, the politicians clearly see that joining the EU also means obligations for Hungary—not only advantages. There is also a consensus among the parliamentary parties on Hungary's NATO membership, and a considerable part of our public also welcomes this opportunity. However, there are also other views. Some people think neutrality would be a more welcome solution.

Partially, I find this understandable because for decades, Hungary was a member of a military alliance, namely the Warsaw Pact, and this considerably limited our opportunities and room for maneuver. However, a country can only achieve neutrality in two ways. One is the historical way taken over the course of centuries, such as Switzerland. Hungary "missed" this opportunity and we cannot change our history now. The other way is neutrality guaranteed by the great powers, such as in the case of Austria. This road can no longer be followed today because the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact has led to the end of the bipolar state of the world and there is no longer a military-political confrontation in the center of Europe. Thus, neutrality has lost its former importance and therefore the great powers would regard such a demand from Hungary as senseless. Neutrality is extremely risky if there are no international guarantees. It also belongs to this picture that, contrary to the general belief, neutrality costs much more than belonging to a military alliance. For a reliable defense, neutral states must spend twice or three times as much on military purposes.

[Pinter] I have heard from a high-level official of the EU committee that it would be better for Hungary to make itself heard more often among the public opinion of the EU member states. What is hindering this?

[Kovacs] The fact that the consistent and broad supply of information essential for the image of this country abroad costs a lot of money. To avoid any misunderstanding, it is not our intention to present Hungary in a more advantageous light than reality; our intention is to have Hungary's image reflect reality. Views of Hungary are sometimes worse than is justified. So far, we have focused on making the EU and the leaders of the member states acknowledge and understand our efforts. At the end of every presidential cycle—namely every six months—we sum up the results of our preparation and formulate the priorities of the following period. In addition, of course, we also think of the public. We have prepared foreign publications and video cassettes and pay special attention to informing the foreign press. Our financial potentials, however, limit these efforts slightly .

[Pinter] The EU negotiating partners of the Hungarian Government are paying increasing attention to Hungary's financial stability. What conclusion do you draw from all this?

[Kovacs] Increased attention is natural. They would also pay attention to Hungary's financial stability even if we did not want to joint the EU. It is not just that Hungary's creditors would like to see their money back. Some $8 billion has been invested in Hungary over the past five to six years and the investors would like to see sound conditions for their ventures. It is also important for new investors to know how the Hungarian economy is doing. The EU and NATO are naturally following future members with even greater attention, and want to know whether the countries in question are heading for stability or instability. The firmer Hungary's internal political and economic conditions are, the better are its integration chances.

[Pinter] Are the approaches of various countries different when the issue on the agenda is Hungary's financial stability or its chances of Euro-Atlantic integration?

[Kovacs] I do not see great differences, for example, between the reactions of European countries and the reactions of countries overseas. It is true, however, that there are countries that traditionally show greater interest in and support for Hungary. For example, Germany treats Hungary with outstanding attention and support. But the opportunities of the German Government have their limits too. Without the desired agreement with the IMF, Germany would not be in a position to provide really serious support for Hungary.

An extremely favorable development is the tangible change in the attitude of France; as a result, we are experiencing more goodwill and a greater readiness to support us. In the course of our talks in Paris in October 1994, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe declared that Hungary would receive the same support for its integration efforts in the future from France as it had received from Germany, because coordination between Paris and Bonn is steady on this matter too. The Hungarian Government is striving for the most intensive relations possible with all the EU member states, because we need the support of all of them for joining the EU. In addition to the countries of decisive weight, we attribute great attention to the smaller countries as well—countries that, in our experience, often understand the situation and efforts of small Hungary better. Since 1 January 1995, we have initiated foreign ministerial talks with the three new EU members: Austria, Finland, and Sweden. These countries are important for us also because, with their experience, they can help us prepare for membership and can also support us at future negotiations.

[Pinter] What are the most frequent observations about the economic and financial measures of the Hungarian Government?

[Kovacs] Several negative phenomena, or phenomena regarded as negative, have attracted the attention of the political and economic leaders of the Western world in recent months. The Hungar-Hotels issue was just such a case. I would like to point out that this affair caused a much more negative reaction in the international press than in foreign government circles. The reason is

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obvious: Economic and financial circles and the newspapers that reflect their views do not like state interference in privatization matters because this always harms some interests. They would also like to exclude state interference even in cases when a government interferes quite justifiably, either because the privatization in question has violated the law or because the deal would be made at a price much below the real value. Nor is it surprising that both the business world and government circles demanded an explanation for the Hungarian finance minister's departure after seven months—a minister whose name was connected with the government's economic program. Obviously, these circles feared some negative changes.

The often personal debates between the two parties that form the Hungarian Government coalition do not benefit Hungary's international reputation either. I only mention this as a fact and not as criticism of the opposition's also doing everything in its power to convince the domestic and international public of the Hungarian Government's "lack of suitability." The storm is over, but the issue of creating an economic-financial stability is still on the agenda. Hungary cannot sign the long-absent agreement with the IMF without a considerable reduction of the budget deficit and the balance of payments deficit. This agreement is an important signal for international political and financial circles. It proves that Hungary continues to be a reliable partner. This is why I regard the creation of Hungary's economic-financial stability and the taking of the necessary immediate steps as a more urgent task than anything else.

Parliamentary Committee Head on Welfare Cuts

AU2203203095 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 17 Mar 95 p 5

[Interview with Judit Csehak, chairman of the Parliamentary Welfare and Health Committee, by Peter Kertesz; place and date not given: "Judit Csehak on Welfare Payments—Additional Strata Will Become Poor"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The 12 March government measures deviate on many points from the accepted government program. The political program cannot be changed through a government decision, Judit Csehak, chairperson of the parliamentary Welfare and Health Committee, believes. Csehak does not agree with having to take 50 billion forints away from welfare policy, out of the 120-billion budget savings.

[Kertesz] What are your views on the government's decision on changing the welfare care system?

[Csehak] I do not know the government decision, but what I do know about it makes me suspect that the decision only consists of more or less decided issues. Except for the childcare allowances [GYET] that have been regulated by government decisions, all the other measures affecting welfare policy require amendments to the law. Therefore, the government decisions will have to be approved through parliamentary laws or amendments. For this reason, I find it especially harmful that the coalition's welfare policy officials were not able to learn about these ideas in advance. We would probably have made important observations, apart from not agreeing with the proposals. All experienced and informed welfare politicians are able to assess the country's situation and the possible need for dramatic cuts. No one doubts the truth of the statement that the government has to act urgently. I mainly dispute that 50 billion forints out of the 120-billion budget savings have to be taken away from welfare policy. My views on this point are markedly different from those of the economic policy makers who say that an even greater reduction is needed in welfare policy. In a social situation in which domestic and foreign researchers unanimously agree that children are the definite losers in Hungary's economic and political changes, I consider all restrictions mistaken that try to make savings in this area.

[Kertesz] Do you also disagree that certain regulations are outdated?

[Chehak] It is undoubtedly true that the current regulation of the childcare fee [gyermekgondozasi dij, GYED] is outdated. At the moment, a mother on a 200,000-forint monthly income also receives 75 percent of her income as a childcare fee. However, this does not mean that the childcare fee should be abolished. The government should say that it will not pay more than 12,000 or 15,000 forints and the problem would be solved immediately. It is obvious that this form of provision, just like family allowances, to which everyone is entitled, should be reexamined because of the changed income structure. At the same time, I am convinced that the family allowance system linked to certified income will not bring major savings, while it requires much administration and high costs. This is completely pointless in a country where the authenticity of income certificates is very questionable.

[keertesz] Can the oft-mentioned principle of needs be asserted under these circumstances?

[Csehak] The data do not show that any significant regrouping could be implemented. In other words, having to save 9 billion forints from the 107 billion earmarked for family allowance does not show the method with which the allowances of low-income families would increase one and a half or two times. It is a mystery to me how the GYED will be merged with the GYES [expansion not provided] that we pay from budget funds rather than from contributions. In addition, the plan is to abolish GYED in such a way that the already acquired right would only be valid until 31 December, which, in my view, can be challenged in the Constitutional Court.

[Kertesz] What happens if the restrictions have a multiplier effect on a family?

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[Csehak] If only I knew the answer. When the two-year supplementary benefit of an unemployed father expires, this will also strongly affect the mother who receives the child care fee. After this, she will only be entitled to GYES until the child is two years old. In the meantime, local governments do not have the support facilities that could be used in such cases for welfare aid. The 9 billion forints are to be given to the local governments to compensate for the abolition of household fuel oil tokens and not because of the withdrawal or reduction of family provisions.

[Kertesz] In your view, who could have been the experts used on this issue—especially since the prime minister said that many months of preparation had preceded the government's decision?

[Csehak] I was certainly not asked, either when the final version was formulated or during the preparation of the preliminary material, if such work was done at all. I object to this because the measures of the government's decision deviate from the Socialist Party's election program and the accepted government program on many points. A political program cannot be changed with a government decision. I accept that a situation in which a one-year-old political program loses its validity can—and does—exist. However, if something completely different has to be done in the given situation, then political forums should operate, in a democratic party, to reexamine the program and inform the citizens that we cannot implement our rogram any more. This way we can save face and will not be called liars.

[Kertesz] What could be the consequences if the government does not yield, and forces its decisions through the parliament?

[Csiha] People on the peripheries of society have very little chance to assert their interests. The same can be said of the unemployed, people at the beginning of their careers, and mothers. Therefore, I do not think that the reason that we should be thinking about different solutions is a possible demonstration in front of parliament of people going to be left out of GYED or losing the family supplement. This is not the real danger of the government decision. The real danger is that we can expect the impoverishment of further strata of society and the shattering of a welfare security that has proved to be very important in the transitional period in the Eastern European countries.

Students Protest Introduction of Tuition

LD2203202195 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1600 GMT 22 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Demonstrations against tuition fees in higher education have been held in several large towns. Responding to the call of the national association of student self-administration bodies, Budapest students were the first to take to the streets. In Miskolc even the lecturers and assistant deans of the university joined the demonstrators. Representatives of the student self-administration body, addressing the rally at City Hall Square, said it was not clear to them what the tuition fees would be spent on.

The demonstration on Dugonics Square in Szeged, which was attended by several thousand students and lecturers, was addressed by the chairman of the Szeged association of the student self-administration body. He condemned the timing of the government decision, noting it was taken in the middle of negotiations and at a stage when 94,000 students had already sent in their application forms.

In Kaposvar some 1,000 higher education students delivered a petition to the town's mayor asking him to pass it on to Finance Minister Lajos Bokros.

The Nyiregyhaza student demonstrators called the introduction of tuition fees unconstitutional, arguing that it would stop the prevalence of equal opportunities.

The rally of the Szarvas Nursery Training High School was attended by Istvan Szoelloesi. Szoelloesi, a deputy of the ruling Hungarian Socialist Party and a trade union leader, said that she generally agreed with the protesting students and would not vote in support of the bill introducing fees when it is submitted in parliament.

High-Ranking Officers Said To Need 'Retraining'

AU2303114895 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 20 Mar 95 pp 1, 3

[Unattributed report: "A Socialist-Style Staff of Generals"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A few weeks ago, THE WASHINGTON POST criticized the generals of the Hungarian Army and viewed the thinking of the general staff officers as old-fashioned. Many domestic opinions both in favor and against have been voiced in the wake of this newspaper article. Many people think that the staff of generals of the Hungarian Army are still thinking according to the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact and are unable to adjust to the changed political circumstances. As a result of the efforts to join NATO, present and future military tasks have changed: Instead of stopping big attacks, the reorganization of the Hungarian Army and peacekeeping and peacemaking missions have come to the fore.

In a recent interview to NEPSZAVA, Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti mentioned the fact that he would like to change the current army leadership when the generals reach the retirement age limit of 55. Keleti would then appoint younger officers who speak foreign languages and who graduated in the West. But there are not yet many such officers.

At present, the Hungarian Army has 79 generals, including 28 brigadier generals, with an average age of 50. The average age of the 45 generals serving as major

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generals is 51.8, while the average age of the 5 lieutenant generals is 54.3—we were told by Janos Gilicz, head of the Human Main Group of the Hungarian Army. The only colonel general in the Hungarian Army, Hungarian Army Commander Janos Deak, is 54, so he has one year more until he reaches the retirement age limit. The youngest general in the army is Brigadier General Laszlo Tancos, commander of the First Military District, who is 42, while the oldest general is Dr Jozsef Farkas, the Army's chief surgeon, serving in the Army hospital.

Among the generals, 37 of them speak one foreign language, 17 speak two languages, and three generals speak three languages at, at least, an intermediate level. Generally, the Russian language is one of these languages. This is so mainly because, except for four officers who graduated from Western military academies, the overwhelming majority of these officers graduated from the military academy of the former Soviet Union. Two generals studied at a U.S. military academy; one general also studied in the United States and graduated from the National Defense Academy; and another general graduated in Great Britain.

Col. Gen. Janos Deak, commander of the Hungarian Army, earlier told the press that it makes no difference what schools the Hungarian generals graduated from, because the Soviet academy also gave them a very serious training. Deak said that there are also several military trends within NATO—namely British, French, German, and U.S. trends—but these are equal. At the same time, military experts pointed out that there are no essential differences between the schools within NATO, while a Hungarian general who graduated in Moscow would not be able to read the military maps of the NATO allies, because the signs are totally different there. How, then, can we speak of joining NATO? Several experts asked the question, including Maj. Gen. Tibor Koszegi, who was later banned from expressing his views.

The average age of the Hungarian officers is 38.1, and some 70 percent of them are university graduates. Some 580 members of the approximately 12,000-13,000 officers studied, or are now studying, at Western military academies. Most of them, 123, studied in Germany; 111 people studied in the United States; 89 people studied at NATO; 41 people studied in Canada; and officers are also studying in Romania and in the CIS countries.

Close to 600 officers graduated from Western military courses or academies in the course of a few years. However, even if 500 officers graduated from a Western academy and took intermediate-level language exams every year, the "retraining" of the entire staff of officers would still take close to 25 years!

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Religious Neutrality in Constitution Opposed

LD2203223195 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 2100 GMT 22 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The episcopate continues to oppose the inclusion in the new constitution of the principle of religious and world-view neutrality of public authorities. Tadeusz Pieronek, secretary of the episcopate, has denied having agreed to the text of the new constitution's provision on relations between church and state with Aleksander Kwasniewski, chairman of the National Assembly Constitutional Commission. According to Bishop Pieronek, such a provision threatens the place of the church in public life and could lead to society's becoming atheistic. Aleksander Kwasniewski said that it is not a question of restricting the freedom of the church, but of guarantees that the authorities treat all churches and religious associations equally.

The commission is to vote on the draft of the provision on relations between the church and the state in two weeks' time.

KRRiTV Gives Critical Assessment of Public TV

WS2303114795 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 23 Mar 95 p 1

[Article by Rafal Szubstarski: "The Hook is Ready for Walendziak"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Bad programming, an overreliance on commercials, lack of reforms—this is how the National Radio and Television Council [KRRiTV] characterizes public television in a document presented to the finance minister. Minister Kolodko will soon issue an opinion on the activities of the Polish Television [TVP SA] Board. "The opinions are categorical, but they were not based on a thorough analysis," says Wieslaw Walendziak.*

The minister of finance, who performs the functions of the TVP SA general assembly single-handedly, is expected to issue an opinion on last year's operations of the television board. If it is negative, he will dismiss that board.

Finance Minister Grzegorz Kolodko turned to the KRRiTV for an opinion on the TVP. A six-page document sent to the minister shows that the TVP fails to meet nearly all of the requirements of the Radio and Television Law.

"The KRRiTV is very critical of the board's programming policy," "the growing dependency of television on profits from commercials," "the TVP has not invested sufficiently in the broadcasting network," "it is absent on the international market of producers," and "sufficient internal reforms were not carried out," writes the KRRiTV to the finance minister.

Even the provision of the Radio and Television Law that speaks of "providing on-screen text services," is, in the opinion of the KRRiTV, not implemented properly.

The KRRiTV also blames the board for "some of the responsibility" for an "irrational escalation" of tension between television and politicians.

"The KRRiTV formulates several categorical opinions, but they were not backed by a thorough analysis," says Wieslaw Walendziak, president of the TVP SA Board, stressing that he is familiar with only certain portions of the document, shown to him by journalists. "The KRRiTV did not even consider it prudent to present the board with the letter 'for our information.' From what I saw, much of the information it contains is false."

Public television was judged less stringently in an annual report submitted by the KRRiTV to the president and parliament last week.

KRRiTV members do not wish to speak of the document prepared for Kolodko because "the minister is the addressee."

"It is unthinkable for a state administrative organ to issue two contradictory statements on one topic within a period of several days," says Tomasz Kwiatkowski, the only member of th KRRiTV who did not take part in work on the document. "The KRRiTV allowed itself to be used as an instrument of the left in the war over television."

Onyszkiewicz Views New Defense Minister

MM2303102895 Katowice TRYBUNA SLASKA in Polish 14 Mar 95 p 4

[Interview with Sejm Deputy Janusz Onyszkiewicz, a member of the Sejm Defense Commission and former defense minister, by correspondent Jerzy W. Bebak; place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Bebak] For several months, our servicemen were doing their routine training-ground exercises, while our Navy's vessels continued their routine sailings. The Armed Forces appeared not to notice the absence of a defense minister at the head of their sector. Now at last we have a new minister. In your opinion, will Mr. Okonski's nomination to that post change anything in our progression toward NATO, or accelerate the process of restructuring the Armed Forces?

[Onyszkiewicz] I believe that the fact that the Armed Forces went on functioning normally during the period in question can be attributed to its day-to-day operations, depending on the General Staff, which is a fairly stable structure. On the other hand, during the past months, we have felt the absence of a Polish voice, a voice from a foreign minister or a defense minister, in the big nationwide debate on the architecture of European security or in the discussion on Poland's place in international structures. We have also felt the absence of

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decisions on the structural reform of the Armed Forces and also of those formations that are supposed to guarantee civilian control over these forces in the civilian and military sector. These matters had been put on ice during the "interregnum" in the Defense Ministry, and I hope that the filling of the vacant post of defense minister will have terminated that period of "limbo."

[Bebak] Listening to you, it is easy to get the impression that Minister Okonski was not your favorite candidate for the post of defense minister....

[Onyszkiewicz] I readily admit that he was not my favorite candidate. I simply believed than another candidate would be much better suited to taking up and successfully concluding many different unfinished matters from the list I mentioned to you. I was thinking of a person who was already conversant with the whole set of defense issues—namely, Deputy [Defense] Minister Milewski. Nevertheless, I cannot say that I do not pin certain hopes on Mr. Okonski: I expect that he will be able to sort out various matters in the defense sector and to clarify the situation between the chief of the General Staff and the defense minister. In this question, the chief of the General Staff must be subordinate to the defense minister. I also hope that now at last Poland's voice will sound louder at a variety of international conferences that require our defense minister's presence and that until now were attended by various parliament members standing in for the minister, even though they were not of comparable grade or sufficient caliber.

[Bebak] But does not the straightforward pressure to approve Mr. Okonski's candidacy that was exerted on the governing coalition by the president suggest that the Armed Forces will now remain under the president's thumb for good?

[Onyszkiewicz] I do not believe that this will happen. The principle that the head of the General Staff should be subordinate to the defense minister must be retained—and I think it will be retained. In any case, such is the unanimous opinion of all major political parties in our party. It is rule from which there can be no exceptions in a democratic state. Even if the president has some rights here, he can only exercise them through the mediation of the defense minister, and there can be no exceptions from this principle because, if the president tried to overrule the defense minister, he would be putting in question the credibility of the Polish political system as a democratic structure. Of course, the president can exert some influence on the functioning of the Armed Forces or our security policy, but he may not use this influence in a high-handed manner. After all, the government is responsible to parliament for the state of affairs in the Armed Forces, while the president has the opportunity to present his concepts by, say, convening government sessions, which he is fully entitled to do, and proposing that the subject in question—for instance, the reform in the Armed Forces—is put on the agenda. In other words, the president has very extensive opportunities to act and does not have to resort to expanding his range of competence by usurping new prerogatives.

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Reform Minister Views Transition Errors

AU2203215495 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 15 Mar 95 pp 1, 6

[Article by Mircea Cosea, president of the Council for Economic Strategy, Coordination, and Reform: "The Mistakes Made in Transition"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] After congratulating the daily ADEVARUL for bringing up such an interesting issue, I will begin by citing the proverb that says "He who works also makes mistakes." By this I do not intend to imply that erring should be made officially acceptable, but rather to point out my position from the very beginning. Thus, in my opinion, erring appears to be an important and constant element of the system of thinking and acting in the economic and social life of the transition period in all the countries undergoing that process. It would be also interesting to see to what extent various countries have had to suffer from the mistakes made, but we will perhaps do this on another occasion. For the time being, I would like to confine myself to Romania.

Another idea that I would like to emphasize from the very beginning is that of culpability. I believe that before starting to blame anyone, one should objectively examine the circumstances and the pressure existing when any particular decision was made, and also consider that no theory or experience of transition was available at the time. Therefore it is necessary to admit certain mitigating circumstances, not just to defuse the political climate, but also to create the prerequisites necessary to correct the mistakes.

I will try to present in a synthetic way the principal errors that were, in my opinion, made during the transitional period in Romania:

1. The Error of Rigidity

Characteristic of the beginning of the transition was the rigid way in which the blueprint on transition that was devised by a group of young U.S. professors headed by J. Sachs was followed. This led to the abrupt liberalization of prices, foreign trade, and the credit system and monetary circulation, which was not correlated to the real state of the economy and did not observe the correct sequence of steps as imposed by the appearance and growth of the various market sectors.

2. The Error of False Evaluation of the Horizons and Type of Development

The formula of "transition from a planned economy to a market economy" was excessively interpreted as one that covered everything and was fully self-sufficient.

This error consists of the absence of any kind of clarification or definition to explain to the population the goal (and even the motivation) of the transition. Thus, they defined the "planned economy" as the point from which the transition sets off, although all modern and efficient economies fully benefit from the advantages offered by planning. Planning cannot and will never be presented as the synthetic expression of the essential evil that we had to discard by all means. Actually that evil consisted of the arbitrary and one-man decisions that perverted the role of planning in Romania, turning it into a kind of "priceless guidelines and recommendations." The final goal of transition was defined as the "market economy." However, this is just the normal way in which economic mechanisms run, and it contains no reference to the temporal-national circumstances under which markets can exist. As a consequence of this error, our planning system was totally and instantaneously destroyed, and thus the baby was thrown out along with the bath water. Romania has lost its chance to use its technical apparatus to monitor and quantify its resources and needs, and has renounced the logic of the balance of the various economic sectors, replacing it with a short-term and circumstantial empirical approach. Instead of depoliticizing planning and using it as an orientation tool, they eliminated the entire planning apparatus without replacing it with anything else.

Another consequence of this error was the acceptance of the idea that the market economy is necessarily identical to the current markets in Western Europe or the United States. This idea ignores not only the national character of economic structures but also the various specific features caused by the development gap in 1989 between Romania and these other countries. The same error accounts for the attempts to imitate other successful national models without sensing the danger that they were incompatible with our country. In my opinion, this error accounts to a great extent for the fact that the population became confused and felt increasingly less motivated, as it became clear that their expectations did not match the reality.

3. The Error of Falsely Interpreting the International Economic and Political Environment

It was erroneously considered that Romania would be immediately and unconditionally granted substantial foreign financial support. The realistic perception of the genuine international circumstances came too late, when the country's hard currency reserves had already been spent and nothing had been undertaken to create a set of policies able to mobilize domestic resources.

4. The Error of Underestimating the Impact of the Cultural, Educational, and Mentality Factors

Without going into too many details, one can say that the idea prevailed that the establishment of a modern and reform-orientated legislative framework would automatically ensure the democratization of the economic and social life. However, in reality the educational and information level, and especially the mentality of the people, imposed the way and the extent to which the legislative framework was followed, and thus they also determined the rhythm and scope of the reform process.

5. Errors Caused by the Populistic Approaches

Among these I would like to highlight the following: the reimbursement of the social partnership shares, the

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reduction of the working week, early retirement, the granting of wage claims (such as in the RENEL [Romanian Electric Power Authority] case,), and the spending of hard currency assets and credits exclusively for consumption purposes.

6. Errors Made in the Promotion of Romania's Image Abroad

Romania's image abroad is doubtless one of the greatest handicaps in furthering our international trade and investment inflow. The depreciation of that image is due to decisions made by various foreign government bodies, anti-Romanian propaganda spread by certain postrevolution personalities, and also our country's official 1990-91 policy, when the desperate efforts to obtain foreign economic support as well as domestic popularity—but in the wrong way—generated a kind of "exhibitionism" that looked pathetic. By pursuing such a policy, Romania presented itself as a country of the physically handicapped, orphans, and AIDS sufferers. The unfortunate setting up—and especially the functioning during 1991 and even 1992—of the State Secretariat for the Physically Handicapped is but one of many such examples. As is known, the things that one does to oneself are very difficult to undo. [passage omitted]

CDR Leader Backs Government on Treaty

AU2303122995 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 20 Mar 95 p 3

[Statement by CDR president Emil Constantinescu issued in Bucharest on 18 March: "On the Matter of the Romanian-Hungarian Treaty, the Democratic Convention of Romania Supports the Government"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At a time when Romania has been placed in a difficult situation by the postponement of the signing of the Romanian-Hungarian Treaty concurrently with the Hungarian-Slovak Treaty, the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR] has decided to give political support to Romania's Government and prime minister, on the occasion of the latter's participation in the Stability Conference in Paris.

We believe that the Romanian-Hungarian Treaty should be based on the provisions of the Framework-Convention on National Minorities—guaranteeing the rights of national minorities—that was signed by more than 20 European states, including Romania. However, as we have repeatedly stated on various occasions, we do not agree with local autonomy claims on ethnic principles, as stipulated by Recommendation 1201.

It is true that the inclusion of this recommendation in the Hungarian-Slovak Treaty created a precedent, which has placed Romania in a delicate situation.

In view of the fact that Romania's only chance resides in its integration into Euro-Atlantic economic, financial, and military structures, the government and the opposition must speed up the adoption of overdue laws on the local administration autonomy, local budget and patrimony, and the education and status of national minorities, which can prove in actual fact that the Hungarian minority in Romania effectively enjoys the rights sanctioned by European standards. The irresponsible statements of certain extremist leaders—which do so much harm to Romania domestically and internationally, by creating the image of a critical ethnic conflict in our country—must stop.

The Romanian-Hungarian Treaty must be concluded. It clearly stipulates the inviolability of borders and the territorial integrity of the two countries. At the same time, it can become a model for guaranteeing the rights of the Romanian minorities in other countries, in accordance with European standards. The CDR will fully support, both domestically and internationally, Romania's interests in concluding this treaty, which is beneficial to both countries and which can ensure stability and economic prosperity in Central Europe.

[Signed] Emil Constantinescu, CDR president

PUNR Distances Itself From Funar Statements

AU2103191195 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 16 Mar p 5

[Unattributed article: "The Standing Bureau of the Romanian National Unity Party Is Distancing Itself From Gheorghe Funar's Communiques"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The latest communiques issued by PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party] President Gheorghe Funar do not always represent the views of the party, stated those present at the 14 March meeting of the PUNR Standing Bureau.

"We are often placed in embarrassing situations because of the communiques or declarations issued by the PUNR president. We often cannot say anything except that we were not aware of their contents or that they were issued without the agreement of the Standing Bureau," PUNR spokesman Mircea Valcu told us.

Bela Marko Explains 'Confrontations' Within Party

AU2203215695 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 15 Mar 95 p 2

[Article by Silviu Achim on statements by UDMR leader Bela Marko: "I Regard Myself as a Radical"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bela Marko, president of the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] granted an interview yesterday, 14 March, to the daily paper 24 ORE MURESENE [24 HOURS IN MURES]. Here are a few of the ideas he expressed on internal turmoil within the UDMR. "I do not accept the idea of a split of the UDMR into a radical branch and a moderate branch, because no clearcut confrontations of such ideas are detectable. The differences are, first of all,

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of a tactical, strategic, or conceptual nature. These could provoke a possible separation into two camps." "When I stated that there are several factions within the UDMR, I accepted that there is a confrontation of ideas, principles, and ideologies within this organization. Thus, implicitly, each group is striving to have the greatest possible influence on and participation in the political activity of the UDMR and its leadership. I cannot deny that there are such confrontations in our party, and I believe that once we come closer to our congress, these confrontations will increase." "Differences (between hardliners and moderates—editor's note) are of a tactical nature. That is, some are in favor of more moderate tactics (which might be more appropriate for dialogue), whereas others believe that the UDMR should at certain times have a tougher attitude in order to achieve its goals. I believe that in political life, one can use various means that are suitable for the times and the goal one wants to achieve. Therefore, I cannot accept the idea that an organization such as the UDMR should select only moderate or only tough methods within its political activity. All these are part of political activity, and I am in favor of balancing these options. I am in favor of using the political means that are suitable for the moment. I find it absurd that we should decide on certain tactics from the beginning, when every day we have to reconsider our means and methods. So far, I have spoken out in favor of conciliation, precisely because somebody engaged in political activity in Bucharest sees things differently from somebody in the organization in Targu Mures or Odorheiu Secuiesc." "I regard myself as a radical and I have often affirmed this. When it comes to solutions and concepts, I express my belief that the major problems of this society in general, and of the Hungarian minority in particular, must be solved through radical changes of mentality. As far as the means by which we can achieve it are concerned—the dialogue with Romanian society, political partners, and all the factors on which these solutions depend—one should act with realism and pragmatism."

Emil Constantinescu Reelected CDR Head

AU2203220295 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1800 GMT 22 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] During a joint meeting of the CDR's [Democratic Convention of Romania] Executive Committee and the CDR Council today, Professor Emil Constantinescu obtained a second mandate as CDR president and the status of that political alliance's sole candidate for the 1996 presidential elections by secret ballot.

Constantinescu obtained four of the six possible votes of the CDR Executive Committee and 13 of the 17 possible votes of the CDR Council.

Professor Constantinescu's opponents were Messrs. Ion Ratiu, vice president of the PNTCD [National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party], who had been proposed by the World Union of Free Romanians; and Nicu Stancescu, the president of the PUSD [Social-Democratic Unity Party].

In a statement made to the press, the CDR president emphasized that the stakes in the 1996 elections are not solely of a political nature. Considering the profound social, political, and moral crisis Romania is currently going through—Constantinescu pointed out—the CDR has to become a political force able to offer the change craved for by the population, our correspondent Elena Perdichi reports.

Armies Seeking To Cooperate in Disasters

AU2103191295 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 17 Mar 95 p 1

[Report by Mediafax: "The Romanian and Hungarian Armies Have Joint Plans for Cases of Calamity"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Civil Defense Inspectorate of the Romanian Army's General Staff and the General Directorate of Hungary's Civil Defense are cooperating with a view to establishing concrete ways of taking action in case of certain calamities or catastrophes. The discussions are taking place in Alba, Sibiu, and Valcea Counties from 14 to 19 March, the Army's press bulletin announces. The talks will focus mainly on the issue of negotiating the "Accord Between the Romanian Government and the Hungarian Government Regarding Cooperation in the Area of Civil Protection in Time of Peace" and the notifying and warning system in case of a calamity.

Defense Minister Discusses UN Angola Mission

AU2303120895 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 11 Mar 95 p 8

[Interview with Defense Minister Gheorghe Tinca by Doru Dragomir; place and date not given: "More Backstairs Influence Was Used for the Romanians Who Have To Go to Angola Than the Actual Number of Soldiers"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

A Mission to Haiti Was Not in Romania's Interest

[Dragomir] There is much talk about the fact that a Romanian battalion is leaving for Angola on a peacekeeping mission. Our newspaper has already published several items on this issue. Why have you volunteered to send Romanian soldiers precisely to Angola?

[Tinca] First of all, we did not volunteer for Angola. When we established the peacekeeping battalion—and two more will also be set up—we did not do so in order to go to Angola. However, by setting up these battalions, we started preparations to fulfill our obligations assumed through the UN Charter: namely to support the organization of peacekeeping activities, and ensuring international security.

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The United Nations, knowing that we have such a battalion ready for peacekeeping, looked it over and asked us to include it among the forces that will carry out the peacekeeping mission in Angola. Other requests to send subunits of the battalion into other areas of conflict, such as Haiti, were not met because it was not in Romania's interests and in line with the criteria adopted by Romania in using its peacekeeping troops.

Now, I am arriving at the idea that sending—and, later, withdrawing—our battalion will depend exclusively on the political decision that Romania will made in connection with the requests we received from the United Nations.

[Dragomir] There are so many states—some of them with the stature of a great power, with an important role in the international arena. Why did Romania feel it had to be in the forefront? Why could it not let others go?

[Tinca] I see that the public has not been informed about either the participation in this mission or what this type of missions involves. Maybe the prevailing opinion is dominated by the images people see on television, images taken at random from each conflict—which might or might not involve peacekeeping forces.

Romania is not in the forefront. On the contrary, it is at the end of the line. Peacekeeping actions have taken place for scores of years, and almost all European countries have participated in such actions. As far as I was told, all Swedish soldiers have had their experience of peacekeeping actions—something that has contributed a great deal to their training. Countries like Poland and the Czech Republic have been participating with their troops in peacekeeping action since the Fifties. The Czech Republic even has a training center for officers where it shares its experience with other countries.

Before the end of the "Cold War," when the world was divided into blocs, it was mainly those two countries that were specialized in such actions on behalf of the Eastern bloc—for reasons that I do not want to discuss now.

Neutral countries or countries that belonged to the nonaligned group that are still participating in such missions today—such as Austria, Sweden, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, and others—frequently participated in such missions. The number of those who support the United Nations by sending troops to peacekeeping missions is quite big and is continuously increasing. I think that I am not mistaken if I say that much more than half of UN members have such an experience. Thus, Romania is not in the forefront. It joins some much wider efforts that have been made by other countries for quite some time now to preserve peace and security in the world, which as a matter of fact is a fundamental obligation assumed through the ratification of the UN Charter.

Our boys will receive "the peacekeeping initiation" in the Angola mission, because it will be the first time that we shall be participating in strength in a peacekeeping mission. In fact, there will be an honorable and experienced company there. There will be troops from Brazil—who will make up the bulk of the mission—and from Portugal, Argentina, Uruguay, Slovakia, Great Britain, India, and Pakistan.

We Are Not Going to War in Angola

[Dragomir] This concern to preserve peace sounds good. The world understands it. But if two sides are fighting, it is their business; so why should Romanian soldiers, our friends or relatives, die in this mission?

[Tinca] Proceeding from the premise that there will be victims, this could have quite a strong emotional impact. In fact, the Army is used to such feelings because this is its vocation. I would not like to be defended by an army that, at the moment it is called upon to fulfill its mission, is dominated by the idea that there are going to be victims. Such discussion is immaterial for the Army. The problem of victims must be studied by the political factor, the one that decides to send soldiers; and when such a decision is made, the real parameters of the action have to be taken into account. We are not going to war in Angola. Our battalion will not have an enemy against whom it engages in military operation with the intention of destroying it. The operation that our battalion carries out will be part of a bigger operation the aim of which is to maintain peace between the sides in conflict. From a military viewpoint, this operation in evaluated and organized by professionals, who take all the necessary precautions according to the concrete conditions in which the operation is to be carried out. There will certainly be risks, but the risk is part of the military profession and this is taken into account.

There will be no artillery bombing in Angola such as we see on television in other areas. There will be no air raids and there will be no clashes between forces that leave behind a field littered with bodies. If the situation deteriorates and there is no chance of peace between the two sides, the UN mission will stop, and the withdrawal plan will go into effect. Moreover, if we believe that the risks exceed the normally acceptable limits for us, we can withdraw our troops even if the United Nations decides to continue the mission. The Romanian state will remain sovereign in deciding how to use its military troops.

There is another question that I have to answer: namely, what do we care that two sides are fighting in Angola?

This is a completely justified question. However, we have to remember that this country has been the victim of internal conflicts for several decades. The Angola conflict is directly linked to the peace of the entire South African region, which in turn affects international security. I must admit that it is more difficult to understand in what way international security concerns us. However, we have to learn to understand that we can no longer live in isolation. If we wish to share the benefits of

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the openness, cooperation, and peace in the world, we must also assume our share of collective responsibility.

Apart from this, we are not indifferent to Angola. Angola is a rich country with which, even in a conflict situation, we used to have good relations. There are prospects for certain projects that are very important for both sides, in an area in which Romania has definitely something to say: namely, oil. Several hundred Angolans have studied in Romania; and in general, in the African region, Romanians, though white, are regarded favorably.

Maybe we should also learn to look at things in the longer term, and in this respect I am sure that Africa has a future.

I believe that the support given Angolans to establish peace in their country and start working on the development of their homeland is also in Romania's interest.

These, then, the reasons that might connect us even to a country that is thousands of kilometers from us.

[Dragomir) It is excellent that Romania has some interests there, but what is the soldier's interest in going there?

[Tinca] When you are a soldier in the army and you are completing your military service, you can have no other interests than those dictated by the country. I will restrict myself to this answer, because the discussion on this issue offers no advantages for the country or the army. The soldier, when called upon to fulfill his mission, must think of the interests of the country that presented him with that mission, and not his own personal interest.

I admit that my answer is totally valid only in the case of war or an attack against Romania. In the case of peacekeeping missions, I must add that we work on a voluntary basis. That means that each soldier in the battalion and in the hospital declares that he wishes to participate, voluntarily, in the respective operation. I suppose this volunteering also involves a personal interest. However, I point out that volunteering is valid only in case of peacekeeping missions, but not when we are talking about the country's defense.

In the Case of the Field Hospital, More People Used Backstairs Influence Than the Actual Number of Soldiers

[Dragomir] As far as I understand, people strive to go, and sometimes they even resort to traditional backstairs influence to gain access to the mission.

[Tinca] You are right. In the case of the field hospital, which will include about 110-120 persons, I myself was faced with more people who wanted to use their influence than the total number of personnel required. Thus, first I had to make a selection of the persons using their influence, and then to select the personnel.

However, I can tell everybody that I have a surprise procedure that I am going to use—namely: Both the people in the hospital and those in the battalion will be selected, in the end, on the basis of professional criteria. Certainly, that person will not be infallible. However, we will do all that is humanly possible to carry out a proper selection.

[Dragomir] But you still have not told me why people are striving to be selected. Are you avoiding the question?

[Tinca] Certainly, most would think that the fact that soldiers are volunteering can be explained through the payments in hard currency that they can obtain there. Today, such an opinion seems reasonable. I have heard people talking about $2,000 per month that soldiers allegedly will receive there—which is preposterous. They will not earn more than $900. Thus, the material attraction is not as great as people think. Even risking incredulous stares, I must say that most soldiers want to go to Angola in order to assert themselves on a professional plane. They wish to see if they are indeed able to perform, in practical terms, what they have learned and what they have been training for thus far.

[Dragomir] Talking about money, will the Romanians be paid like the others, or will they undermine the market just like in other areas?

[Tinca] They will not undermine the market because they have no way of doing so. The market is not free. It is controlled by the United Nations, because this organization is paying for the mission. However, I wish to tell you that other states have the possibility of paying their soldiers a certain, probably substantial, sum—apart from what the United Nations is giving them. We and many others like us will not be able to do this, for obvious reasons. However, our people will receive the salaries that they have at home in lei.

[Dragomir] I suggest that we proceed from theoretical discussions to talking about concrete issues. How many soldiers are going to go and what are the details of organizing and carrying out this mission?

[Tinca] If Romania's parliament makes the political decision that we should participate in the UNAVEM [UN Angola Verification Mission] III peace mission in Angola, the Romanian Army has an infantry battalion prepared for this including about 800 people and a field hospital in which 120 people will be working.

As far as the departure is concerned, I can tell you that the field hospital will leave first—that is, the equipment in the last part of March and the personnel at the beginning of April (6 April). The hospital will be set up in Angola's capital city, Luanda.

The battalion will leave in two stages: An advance detachment on 21 March and the entire troop at the end of May.

[Dragomir] Is this mission that Romania is involved in connected in any way with the Partnership for Peace and our country's integration into NATO?

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[Tinca] This mission is carried out under the aegis of the United Nations. NATO has no connection with it whatsoever. Nevertheless, peacekeeping missions will also be organized within the Partnership for Peace and NATO, too, in the future. However, our participation in Angola—I have to repeat—has no connection with NATO or the Partnership for Peace.

[Dragomir] Thank you very much Mr. Minister.

Daily Describes Makeup of Peacekeeper Battalion

AU2303121695 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 11 Mar p 8

[Article by Doru Dragomir: "Organization of Romanian Infantry Battalion That Will Participate in UNAVEM III Mission"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

The Approval of the Parliament Is Required

According to Romania's defense military doctrine, the major mission of the Army, in cooperation with the other groups of the national defense system, is to fight back whatever enemy forces have entered the national territory, or to counteract aggressive internal actions with which the law enforcement bodies and those in charge of preserving public order cannot cope. However, under certain conditions, with the parliament's approval, the Army can contribute with military and civilian personnel to certain peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, at the request of international bodies. In this connection, the first Romanian peacekeeping battalion was set up in September 1993.

The Battalion Is Organized as an Infantry Battalion

The battalion is organized as an infantry battalion. Thus, its structure includes command elements, combat-assisting subunits [subunitati de asigurare de lupta], combat subunits, and logistics groups. The combat-assisting subunits are grouped in a General Staff company, directly subordinated to the head of the General Staff of the unit, who is also the first deputy to the commander. These subunits include a platoon of each of the following: reconnaissance, engineer corps, chemical protection, communication, and radio.

As far as the combat subunits are concerned, they are composed of three identically organized infantry companies, a 120-mm launcher battery, a combined antitank battery, and an antiaircraft battery that includes machine guns and rockets.

The logistics subunits and groups include a supply and transportation platoon, a workshop for military technology repair work, a sick bay, and a dental surgery. [sentence as published] The battalion has Romanian-made means of transportation and these include TAB's [Armored Amphibious Personnel Carriers], jeeps, and trucks for the transportation of the troops. The soldiers' personal weapons are also Romanian-made and include 5.45mm and 7.62mm submachine guns and (AG-7, AG-9) grenade launchers. For individual protection the soldiers use bulletproof helmets and vests.

The Battalion Includes a Sergeant Who Is the Chairman of the Romanian Kung-Fu Organization

In concrete terms, the unit consists of 62 officers, 22 warrant officers, 82 noncommissioned officers, 252 enlisted men, and 349 soldiers who carry out their activitives in the respective unit. Their equipment consists of 41 [figurue as published] TABs, three 82mm mortar launchers, and 36 grenade launchers.

Many of this battalion's soldiers are kung fu, kick-boxing, judo, and karate experts. Sergeant Daniel Stanciu is the national tae kwon do vice champion and is the chairman of the Romanian kung fu organization. During the training, the soldiers have been at times overworked both physically and intellectually. This was done in order to enable them to fulfill the following types of missions: observation, patrol, supervising areas of conflict, administering first aid, participating in actions that involve separating clashing forces, supervising accords and agreements, participating in demilitarization actions, ensuring the resettlement of refugees, accompanying convoys, participating in distribution of humanitarian aid, and protecting VIPs. The people included in this battalion have been selected on the basis of specific criteria that has been worked out by the directorate in charge of personnel and the Directorate for Political Analysis and International Relations.

Together with the "blue helmets" battalion and a Military Police platoon, a field hospital will also participate in UNAVEM [UN Angola Verification Mission] III. The field hospital will include medical groups (filing section, medical rooms, sick wards, and a laboratory) and logistics groups. The field hospital will include 105 military medical personnel and 131 military personnel to safeguard the logistical activity.

So far, Romania has also participated in humanitarian and peacekeeping actions carried out under UN aegis with a military field hospital both in the Gulf War and in the UNOSOM [UN Operation in Somalia] II operation in Somalia, and with military observers in UNIKOM [UN Iraq/Kuwait Observer Mission] Kuwait in Kuwait and UNAMIR [UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda] in Rwanda.

Battalion Makeup

AU2303121395

[FBIS Editorial Report] Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian on 11 March carries on page 8 a table entitled "The Organization of the Romanian Infantry Battalion That Will Participate in the UNAVEM [UN Angola Verification Mission] III Mission"

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In the middle of the table there is a box containing the word "COMMANDER" with the word "Command" under it. Four types of units are shown as deriving from this box, as follows:

"1. Infantry Company (in TAB—armored amphibious carriers—and in vehicles):

Troops:

—Officers.....62

—Warrant Officers.....22

—NCO's.....82

—Enlisted Men.....52

—Soldiers.....49

Total.....767

"2. Support Company and 3. Military Police Platoon

Technology:

—14 Armored Amphibious Carriers

—14 Machine guns, 14.5 mm

—26 Machine guns, 7.62 mm

—3 Mortar launchers

—36 Grenade launchers (portable)

—62 Trucks

"4. Subunits and Logistics Groups:

—To ensure material supply and transportation

—Medical groups

—Military technology repair."

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Text of Petersburg Agreement on B-H Federation

AU2303132895 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 12 Mar 95 pp 4-5

["Complete" text of the agreement on relations between the Croatian and the Bosniak people in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, signed by Federation President Kresimir Zubak and Vice President Ejup Ganic in Petersburg near Bonn on 9 March: "There is No Alternative to the Federation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bonn—In the German capital Bonn on Thursday, representatives of the Croatian and the Bosniak-Muslim sides signed the agreement that sets out specific steps for the implementation and vitalization of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The two delegations were led by President of the Federation Kresimir Zubak and Vice President Ejup Ganic. The agreement was signed after 19 hours of talks behind closed doors, under the auspices of German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel. On that occasion Kinkel called both sides to implement what was agreed upon, admitting that it is going to be very difficult.

We carry the complete text of the agreement, which says:

1. We, the undersigned, met on 8 and 9 March 1995 at Petersburg, at the invitation of the German Government, in order to hold talks behind closed doors so that we can give a new, constructive impetus to the implementation of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by concrete agreements. At the beginning of our meeting, we were received by German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel. On that occasion, we underlined the significance of the Federation as the central element of the peace settlement for Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as our continuous dedication to the Contact Group plan. Aware of our responsibility for the full implementation of the Washington, Vienna and Zagreb agreements, we reached agreement on the following issues:

We support the most rapid and comprehensive implementation of the Constitution of the Federation as well as the supplementary agreements. For us there is no alternative to the Federation.

We proceed from the fact that the government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its bodies, without encroaching upon the republic's sovereignty and territorial integrity, should transfer their tasks in the current transitional period to the government and authorized bodies of the Federation to the extent that those bodies carry out their duties as provided by the Federation's Constitution. At the same time the administrative bodies in the regions under the control of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] will be reduced tp the extent that the bodies of the Federation carry out their constitutional duties. After the establishment of all the federal institutions of authority, the bodies of authority in the regions controlled by the HVO will be dissolved.

In our public appearances and contacts with the media we shall always focus on our interest in the continuous building of the Federation and further strengthening of the existing mutual trust.

2. In that respect we shall encourage by all means the implementation of the Federation at the local, cantonal, and federal level. For that purpose we have agreed on the following concrete steps:

2.1. Municipal Assemblies (Deadline: 1 April 1995)

2.1.1. Political Responsibility

President Zubak will assume full political responsibility for the establishment of municipal assemblies on the territory of the Federation under the control of the Croatian armed forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina (HVO) by 1 April 1995.

Vice President Ganic will assume full political responsibility for the establishment of the municipal assembles on the territory of the Federation under the control of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina [BH Army] by 1 April 1995.

2.1.2. The institutions, that is, municipal and cantonal people's assemblies, will be established on the basis of the latest democratic elections, provided that all the parties that won mandates in those elections are represented unconditionally and directly. In the municipalities with close election results, the strongest party has a right to nominate a candidate for the most important function, whereby principles of the parliamentary democracy must not be violated. The designation of five deputies for the cantonal assembly by the municipal assemblies will be carried out on the basis of the results of the latest democratic elections, taking into consideration the national structure of the population there as well. The political parties will agree on that subsequently. If there is no agreement by 1 April 1995, this question will be settled by arbitration or a decision of the Constitutional Court.

2.2. Cantons (Deadline: 15 April 1995)

We welcome the already formed cantons in the Federation. On the basis of the agreed clause 2.1. and the political responsibility that we have assumed, we shall ensure that all the cantons that have not yet been formed, including cantons No. 6 and 7 (the central Bosnian and Neretva canton) are established by 15 April 1995.

Doljani—Doboj Thoroughfare as a Transitional Measure (Deadline: 1 April 1995)

As of 1 April 1995 the freedom of movement for people, goods and capital along the Doljani-Doboj road will be overseen by the federal police, composed in compliance with the national makeup of the cantons through which this road passes.

The federal police is a temporary solution until the establishment of the police forces at the level of cantons,

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in compliance with the Law on Internal Affairs that will be passed within the deadline envisaged by clause 2.6 of this agreement, whereas the ultimate deadline for the implementation of this law is 1 June 1995. At the border passage of Doljani, no fee is to be paid for customs registration.

2.3 The Government of the Federation (Deadline: 1 April 1995)

2.3.1 The government of the Federation with its ministries must be expeditiously formed and obtain financial resources for the execution of its tasks in the territory of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The structures of authority must be further constituted.

2.3.2. The government of the Federation and its ministries exercise exclusive state authority over the territory of the Federation within the limits of their constitutional duties. They do not encroach upon the continuity, international legitimacy and territorial integrity of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, or on the tasks of the republican government in that respect. The duties of the republican government cannot interfere with the duties of the government of the Federation.

2.3.3. We have intensively discussed the strengthening of the government of the Federation and agreed that we should examine the following concrete proposal:

First, all the ministries of the Federation, fully composed, will start performing their functions on the territory of the Federation as of 15 April 1995. In order to implement this, at the same time as the establishment of the cantons cited in clause 2.2., the existing civil authorities in the territories under the control of the BH Army and HVO, unless they are already formed in compliance with the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, will be replaced by authorized institutions of the Federation in compliance with the Constitution of the Federation.

Second, the staff of the federal ministries will be designated anew by 15 April 1995 by the respective ministers and deputy ministers. The staff will be predominantly composed of the employees that have worked in the respective ministries so far.

2.3.4. We have agreed to dispatch the result of the examination of this proposal by 1 April 1995 to the Permanent Commission in Sarajevo, so its members can forward it to their respective governments.

2.4. Ambassadors (Deadline: 15 April 1995)

The staff of the Foreign Ministry (except for ambassadors, ministers-advisers and consul generals) and the occupation of posts with the diplomatic-consular missions will be determined anew on the basis of proposals agreed upon by the foreign minister and his deputy. The clauses of the Zagreb agreement dated 15 September 1994 will be implemented regarding the designation of ambassadors. The list of the candidates for ambassadorial posts will be forwarded by the Croatian side by 15 April 1995. The Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina will designate its candidates within two months.

2.5. Armed Forces (Deadline: 15 April 1995)

The armed forces will be constituted without any discrimination on religious or national grounds. Soldiers will wear uniforms without symbols of their religious affiliation or their party's emblems. The draft of the Bill on the Armed Forces will be submitted to the Constitutional Assembly for adoption by 15 April 1995, while the act will come in force at the latest when the final peace settlement for Bosnia-Herzegovina is achieved and implemented, or at any earlier point of time agreed upon by the authorities of the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the transitional period, without encroaching upon the continuity of the BH Army or HVO, we shall be further building and strengthening the duties of the joint staff formed in compliance with the Split agreement dated 12 March 1994 (the Delic-Roso agreement) and the Zagreb agreement of 14 September 1994.

2.6. The Police and Judiciary (Deadlines: 1 and 15 April 1995)

The Bill on Interior Affairs worked out by the Interior Ministry will be forwarded to the Constitutional Assembly for adoption by 1 April 1995, and it is planned to become effective immediately. The Ministry of Justice will push the establishment of the federal administration of justice and work out a draft of the bill on the establishment of the human rights court. The lists of candidates for judicial functions will be submitted by 15 April 1995.

We shall send an appeal to the International Court of Justice in The Hague to ensure that the constitutional judges appointed in compliance with the Constitution begin performing their functions as soon as possible.

2.7. The Media (Deadline: 15 April 1995)

We shall form a media experts commission, that will be assigned to work out by 15 April 1995 concrete proposals for strengthening freedom of the press in the federal media space, which will contribute to strengthening trust in the Federation.

2.8. Refugees and Displaced Persons (Deadline: 15 April 1995)

We consider the question of refugees and displaced persons to be one of the most urgent problems of the Federation, the solution of which demands expeditious yet well-considered steps, as well as a stable institutional framework at the same time. The Ministry for Refugees and Welfare Policy will work out a program for the return of refugees and displaced persons, that will have been approved by President Zubak and Vice President

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Ganic, and presented together with the deadline for its implementation to the Permanent Commission in Sarajevo by 15 April 1995. The program, without aspiring to present a global solution of the question of refugees, will comprise short-term and medium-term projects, determining also the federal institutions needed for its implementation. The proposals of the projects will be conceptualized in such a way that their implementation will not significantly change the demographic structure of cantons 6 and 7.

3. Verification (Report to be Submitted by 19 April 1995/Meeting to be Held by 25 April 1995)

We are convinced that by these concrete steps, designed to aid the implementation of the Constitution of the Federation that will follow shortly, we shall make considerable contribution to the reestablishment of trust between the Bosniaks and the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In order to report on the timely fulfillment of the commitments that we have undertaken by this agreement and consult on further substantial steps toward the expeditious and thorough implementation of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, we have agreed to meet again on 25 April 1995 in Bonn, or in some other place to be agreed. In order to prepare that meeting we shall forward a temporary report on the steps accomplished to the Permanent Commission in Sarajevo by 19 April 1995. At the same time we ask the ambassadors, members of the Permanent Commission, to follow the implementation of this agreement themselves and inform their governments on that.

The parts of the agreement that refer to the exclusive duties of the Republic, for instance, with respect to the republican institutions in the transitional period, will be forwarded for verification to the republican Assembly by 31 March 1995. Those parts that refer to the duties of the Constitutional Assembly will be verified by that Assembly.

We thank German Foreign Minister Kinkel for inviting us to hold this meeting, and the German Foreign Ministry for services it provided to ensure the smooth course of the meeting.

The document was signed by: Kresimir Zubak, president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (head of the delegation), Ejup Ganic, vice president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (head of the delegation), Jadranko Prlic, deputy prime minister and defense minister, Ivan Bender, deputy in the Assembly of the Federation, Vladislav Pogarcic, deputy foreign minister, Kasim Begic, adviser, Kasim Trnka, ambassador, in the presence of Michael Steiner, official of the Foreign Ministry of the FRG.

Izetbegovic Sets UN Deadline for New Mandate

AU2303105895 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 23 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The UN Security Council is awaiting with interest UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali's report on the UN Protection Force's [UNPROFOR] new mandate in Croatia. The report is overdue, and the two resolutions announced [words indistinct] since the (?letters) send by Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, are bound to cause considerable turmoil.

The letter sent by Alija Izetbegovic warns of the increasing disparity between UNPROFOR's mandate on paper and its implementation on the ground. The present mandate expires in a few days and there is little time for major changes. President Izetbegovic gives 30 days at the most as the deadline for taking into account the new situation and carefully drafting a new resolution. The president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency is not asking for a change of the mandate, but a stricter implementation of the existing one. [passage omitted]

Ganic Wants Turkey To Give Funds to Federation

NC2303110095 Ankara TURKISH DAILY NEWS in English 20 Mar 95 p A5

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Ejup Ganic, vice president of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and also the vice president of the Federation of Bosnia-Croatia, told the TURKISH DAILY NEWS [TDN] that he expected Turkey to contribute to the funds necessary to translate the federation into a living reality. Ganic, at a press conference Friday [17 March] at the National Press Club, said that what they had was only "a roof," and it was time to start building walls underneath the roof and "build Bosnia from inside." Electing municipal authorities was a step in that direction, he said. In the last two days, Ganic has met with President Bill Clinton, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, Secretary of Defense William Perry, and Senator Bob Dole to drum up more support for the federation and to activate an emergency airdrop to the Bihac region. The U.S. State Department celebrated the first anniversary of the federation with an opulent ceremony at the department which was attended by Turkish Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Murat Karayalcin. Ganic met yesterday in Washington with Karayalcin during a meeting of the "Friends of the Federation" which includes, among others, the United States, Turkey, Canada, Indonesia, Norway, Sweden, Malaysia, United Kingdom, Germany. When the TDN asked Ganic what he expected Turkey to do as a "friend of the federation," Ganic said he expected Turkey to dip into her pockets "in accordance with her economic ability," since the security interests of the two countries were linked together. "Security in Bosnia is closely tied to Turkey as well as to the security of Turkey," he said. "I expect them (Turkey) to commit funds in accordance with the economic ability of that country, security interests of their country for the Balkans region, and of course, for the friendship of many Bosnians who migrated to Turkey during the repression. But I cannot (tell you) the figures and commitments that Turkey has made." Ganic said Karayalcin did not make any specific

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monetary commitments during their talk. He added that a total of $100 million was already committed to the federation during technical talks held in Washington and said the total figure could eventually reach $300 million.

Ganic Addresses Forum on State, Economy

AU2203190095 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 22 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The first discussion forum organized by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Chamber of Commerce, which was held today, dealt with the topic of the relations between the state and the economy. Ejup Ganic, member of the Presidency and vice president of the Federation, spoke at this meeting. Here is a report by Mladen Bosnjak:

[Begin recording] [Bosnjak] At the very start of his address to an impressive gathering of businessmen, economics professors, state officials, and others, Professor Ejup Ganic asserted that there is no economy into which the state and its politicians do not interfere, to some extent and in different ways, and exert a certain influence on it. This is also the way it has been and must be in Bosnia-Herzegovina, now and in the future.

The Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as a form of state that is being built at the moment, is an example that can by no means be an exception in this respect.

[Ganic] The project of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the process of its implementation, which has continuously been [word indistinct] with specific agreements, is now under the direct [(word indistinct] of the international factor, the well-known Bonn agreement, represents a direct activity in this sense.

Of course, [word indistinct] of the Federation, seen from the economic aspect, is the one that represents the first and initial space, both the space for manifesting power and for developing economic relations. It is that nucleus that will reintegrate the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this respect, the political agreement between representatives of the Bosniaks and Croats is going to condition the characteristics of the economic system to a large extent. This is evidence that, in fact, economy is a (?servant) to politics.

[Bosnjak] The place and role of the state today is to provide conditions for the country's defense and the survival of the population. According to Mr. Ganic, the strategic aim for the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina is as follows:

[Ganic] The process of building the Bosnia-Herzegovina economy will be long and painful. In the buildup of the political [word indistinct] and political system, it is [word indistinct] to take care on the compatibility of that system with the demands set by developed market economies in the world. It is a fact that our orientation is to build a society of parliamentary democracy and a market-orientated economy. This implies many obligations and activities by the state that are still to be undertaken with a view to integrating [word indistinct] of Bosnia-Herzegovina into the system of the so-called world economy.

It is the state that will ensure the necessary room [words indistinct] economic laws, market laws to be manifested and economic institutions to function. In this respect, the state should give up the so-called instrumentalization, [words indistinct], and the regulation of certain economic currents, so that the atmosphere [words indistinct] creating and contributing to the development of [word indistinct] in all spheres of human activity.

[Bosnjak] These were a couple of basic assertions on the relation of the state toward the economy that Presidency Member Ejup Ganic expressed at the discussion forum of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Chamber of Commerce today.

There are a few more highlights from his address and the questions and answers that followed, that is, a brief direct conversation between the people present and Prof. Ejup Ganic. In Dr. Ganic's opinion, the key issues are a successful privatization of state property, the development of entrepreneurship, and the organization of food production and of the internal Bosnia-Herzegovina market.

As we said in the beginning, this was the first economists' discussion forum, which will be followed by others. Is this not a sign that the economy has been waking up and that it will be more than a servant to politics? [end recording]

Karadzic Says Serbs Will Defend Serb Krajina

AU2203220695 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian Serb) in Serbo-Croatian 14 Mar 95 p 2

[Statement by Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic for SRNA; place and date not given: "A Right to Symmetry"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The president of the Serb republic [RS], Radovan Karadzic, told SRNA [Bosnian Serb news agency] that the military alliance of Croatia with the Croats and the Muslims in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina gave the Serbs in the RS and the republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK] the full right to establish political, state and military connections with Yugoslavia. "If and when that will happen depends only on the will of Belgrade and Podgorica," the RS president said.

Emphasizing that the Croatian-Muslim military coalition came as no surprise for the Serbian side, President Karadzic recalled that members of the Croatian Army had slaughtered the Serbs in Sijekovac village near Bosanski Brod and in Kupres long before the Serbian-Muslim war in former Bosnia-Herzegovina broke out.

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According to Karadzic, the Serbs in the RS will take up arms to defend the RSK if the Republic of Croatia attacks Knin.

"Regardless of the proclamation of the state of war, we are in a state of direct war danger and, if it is necessary, we shall fight together and defend Krajina," the RS president explained. President Karadzic underlined that the international community must face the truth that it was Croatia and Slovenia, and then also Bosnia-Herzegovina, that had caused the war in the region by their unilateral secessions. Thereafter, they attempted to discipline the Serbs, who did not accept the separation from Yugoslavia.

Commenting on the resignation submitted by Radoslav Brdjanin, minister for urban planning, housing development, public utilities and civil engineering and coordinator for economy in the RS Government, the RS president and chairman of the Serbian Democratic Party of the Serbian states [SDS SZ] wished good luck and prosperous work to the individuals who are leaving the party after five years of joint struggle. "There is no breach in the SDS. Certain individuals are leaving it, but it still remains huge. People are leaving it because they have ambitions and aspirations for leadership of their own, or because they support some other political platform—all this is natural. We thank our former collaborators for their five-year-long cooperation and wish them good luck in their work," Karadzic said, while the only thing he may feel ill-will about is that they chose such an unfavorable moment to found new parties.

Reviewing the accusations that the aforementioned individuals brought against the SDS and the state leadership, the RS president said: "The responsible state organs will take certain measures to clear up all the errors ascribed to the state leadership. Those rumors are false, and I oppose them severely. However, for the sake of our people, we have to investigate and clear them up." As the chairman of the party, Karadzic also commented on the announced foundation of the Serbian People's Party, which Brdjanin said would be based on the platform of Jovan Raskovic's SDS. "I have nothing against the idea that all other parties adopt Raskovic's principles, just as the SDS SZ did," Karadzic said.

Commentary on Belgrade's Moves Against Martic

AU2303085595 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian Serb) in Serbo-Croatian 14 Mar 95 p 6

[Commentary by Ostoja Nikolic: "Will the Una River Be Like the Drina?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It was precisely at the moment when Croatian President Franjo Tudjman was refusing to extend the mandate to UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force], thereby making it clear to the entire world that he wanted to attack the republic of Serbian Krajina, that a new front was opened in Knin. As the public already knows well, this time it concerns a rift in the Krajina leadership. On one side there is the president, Milan Martic, while on the opposite side there is the prime minister, Borislav Mikelic. The former submitted a demand to the assembly that the latter should be removed, which did not happen, but what did happen is that now even casual newspaper readers know that in the Krajina leadership there exists the minimum of unity. And all this at a time when the specter of a new war is threatening to wipe out all the sacrifices that the state and the people of republic of Serbian Krajina made for freedom. This fact makes the breach even more senseless and tragic, but it has to be admitted that it is typically Serbian.

Of course, it would be naive to believe that the overheated atmosphere in Knin is a consequence of some private conflict. Belgrade opposition circles are claiming that Martic, Mikelic, the assembly chairman, Rajko Lezajic, and the foreign minister, Milan Babic, had a briefing with Milosevic several days ago, where they were told that the question of Mikelic's removal must not appear on the republic of Serbian Krajina assembly's agenda under any circumstances. Babic took care that this should be so, because had the deputies of his Serbian Democratic Party of Krajina, together with the Radicals, voted differently, Mikelic would most probably have been only a former prime minister by now. But that did not happen, and everything has remained as it was before; it is only that Babic's role adds a particular flavor to the entire story. He is a popular personality in Krajina with undisputable qualities, but he is also a great tragedian, who is quite familiar with absolute transformations in politics. Milosevic has twice brought about his downfall: the first time because of his stubborn rejection of the Vance plan and the second time on the occasion of the presidential elections in Krajina. The elections were annulled and repeated twice, until Babic had definitely lost and Martic had won. Who would have thought that the current foreign minister of the republic of Serbian Krajina would forget all about that so quickly and side with Mikelic, who is considered to be Milosevic's gray eminence in Krajina? Nevertheless, I guess it is also some kind of politics, just like everything that is happening with Martic is politics as well.

Belgrade has obviously misjudged Martic. Its plan to make a puppet out of the legendary warrior and commander has failed, so now, with the same fervor, it is endeavoring to marginalize him on the political stage of Krajina. After all, bear this in mind: While the leadership of Serbia is loosing the most poisonous shafts at the leadership of the Serbian republic [Serbian entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina], Martic is openly and directly showing his affinity for Pale; while official Belgrade is imposing sanctions on the people of the Serbian republic, Martic is forming a joint military alliance with the leadership of those same people for defense from the mutual enemy, and is increasingly opening the borders between the two Serbian states west of the Drina. Of course, official Belgrade will never forgive him for this and it is only a question of time until a more severe

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campaign aimed at overthrowing Martic will start in Belgrade. The overture might be the sudden disappearance of the president of republic of Serbian Krajina from Belgrade television broadcasts. Awkwardly and incredibly as this may sound, Babic is now being mentioned as Martic's possible successor! Nevertheless, who knows?—if he could lose elections already won, why could he not become president in a similar fashion, even if he were to win lost elections? Particularly if this has been promised to him. But what is he supposed to do in return?

The entire story does not end with this, because the question remains: Why all this? None of the possible answers is particularly plausible, except that the aim is to disrupt the good relations between the republic of Serbian Krajina and the Serbian republic and to establish an impenetrable border on another Serbian river, this time the Una [dividing Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia]. This would be Belgrade's final effort to crush the leadership in Pale, so that the Serbian republic would remain completely isolated. Belgrade would thereby achieve its goal, but not for long. Martic may be suitable for one or the other side, while Karadzic, Babic, or other Serbian officials west of the Drina may come and go, just like those in Serbia, but the people will remain that does not want to go and has nowhere else to go, for whom all these games sound like blasphemy to the many victims who gave their lives for our freedom. The players of the political teams on both sides of the Drina should keep this in mind.

Bosnian Serb Soldiers Demand Pay, Equality

95BA0188B Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 22 Feb 95 p 5

[Article by Radivoje Gutic: "Patriots on the Payroll"]

[FBIS Translated Text] We have started to eat roots, just as Dr. Radovan Karadzic, president of the Srpska republic [RS], promised us.

In a stormy meeting with representatives of the Command of the Herzegovina Corps and the opstina government, this statement was made the night before last in Bileca by fighting men from this town in stating their demand for equal treatment for all members of the army of the Srpska republic and for rectification of their material situation.

Numerous critical remarks were made about the internal policy conducted by the RS leadership, and they were addressed to the Assembly of Bileca Opstina because of "poor performance." The unemployed fighting men say that they and their families are on the verge of poverty, because for all of eight months now they have not received a single dinar or any material assistance. At the same time, it was said, the unemployed fighting men from the areas of Trebinje and Gacko have been receiving both money and material assistance from their respective opstinas. Captain First Class Vlado Micic commented on this by saying that "we already have opstina armies, and soon we will even have village armies."

In any case, fighting men who are employed but are not working because of their involvement in the ranks of the RS army are also receiving pay from their enterprises.

"It is our fate that we remain in these areas, but a piece of bread must also be found for us. All we want is to survive," the fighting men said. "This is probably the only army in the world in which some receive pay, if only minimal, while others receive nothing, although they are in the same trenches. This causes discord and greatly weakens morale in the Serbian army."

There was also criticism that during wartime in the Srpska republic immense funds have been invested in building monasteries and churches, and even the government buildings in Pale, while at the same time some fighting men are going hungry.

"Where does the RS government get the money to build a new building, but is unable to furnish funds for soldiers' salaries?" added Colonel Obrad Vuckovic.

Miroslav Lecic is of the opinion that no one is taking Herzegovina into account and that the influential Krajina and Sarajevo lobbies are fighting only for their own respective interests, and Obren Batilic, president of the opstina government, said that Herzegovina is only expected to give, but is given nothing. One of the things he mentioned was 300,000 metric tons of aluminum carried away from here early in the war, and no one knows even today what happened to it.

Remarks were also made to the effect that private operators are sitting in the parliamentary benches of the Srpska republic and Bileca Opstina who think first about their earnings, while everything else is secondary, including defense of the country.

"They swear allegiance to the Serbian cause, but actually they are only interested in money," Lieutenant Rade Radovic was categorical. "Rallies and hubbub produce them, but they are not meant to govern. They live extremely well and pray to God that this situation lasts as long as possible."

Poverty would not be difficult for the unemployed fighting men in Bileca if in Herzegovina and the Srpska republic there were not an entire army of smugglers and war profiteers. "Thievery is flourishing," they say, "and the laws of the profiteers are in effect," and they also mention the "sheiks of Bileca," who stand at the gates of certain factories and distribute money to the workers from their briefcases.

Belgrade Alleges Torture in Croat-Muslim Camps

LD2303110995 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1019 GMT 23 Mar 95

["Pool" item]

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[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, March 23 (TANJUG)—A team of experts of the Belgrade Medical School has established that as many as 37 ways of physical, 11 ways of psychological and 14 combined ways of torture had been applied on the prisoners in the Croat-Muslim camps in the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Most of those examined were civilians forced to put on uniforms to give them the appearance of war prisoners, the Belgrade medical experts' report said.

The team, in keeping with the existing international norms, wrote the report to be presented as an official document to to public, and which has already been sent to the federal committee for collecting information on committed crimes against humanity and international law.

This report differs significantly from the 'spectacular' discoveries of news reporters, such as in the case of the figure used that several scores of ten thousand of raped Muslim women, launched at the time by THE NEW YORK TIMES.

The list of ways of torture—physical, psychological and combined—was highly provisional, because any torture, violence and stress it produces, leaves lasting consequences on both physical and mental health, said Doctor Branimir Aleksandric of the Belgrade of Institute for Forensic Medicine, and also a team member.

The most serious psycho-traumatic experience, he added, emerges as a consequence of lasting states of anxiety, uncertainty, fear and helplessness before violence and humiliation to which the victims in the prison camps have been subjected.

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Granic on Talks With Agnelli, New UN Mandate

LD2203195395 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 22 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Italy will support the U.S. stand on the mandate of the new peacekeeping forces, which are to replace UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] in Croatia, Italian Foreign Minister Susanna Agnelli said after the talks with her host. Albino Cehic reports: [passage omitted]

[Begin Foreign Minister Mate Granic recording] We devoted most attention to the situation in our region—the occupied territories of the Republic of Croatia—particularly in the light of our decision to terminate UNPROFOR's mandate and the talks which President Tudjman had in Copenhagen, Washington, New York, as well as the latest meeting, i.e. the OSCE conference in Paris. We also talked about the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the application of the Washington agreements and a risk of a war escalation.

We expect UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali to submit a report to the UN Security Council over the next few days and after that the UN Security Council to pass two resolutions: one on the termination of the mandate and another one on new international presence in the Republic of Croatia, which will include a control [kontrola] of the Croatian borders and a supervision [nadzor] of the implementation of the existing agreements. We expect the mandate to be for the Republic of Croatia alone, of a limited duration and with a specially appointed commander, and [we expect] this mandate to enable the continuation of the peace process and the reintegration of the occupied areas of the Republic of Croatia into the state and legal system of the Republic of Croatia as soon as possible. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Commentary on Changing International Mediators

AU2303112295 Rijeka NOVI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 21 Mar 95 p 2

[Commentary by Drazen Vukov Colic: "The Same Work Done by Different People"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Thorvald Stoltenberg and Yasushi Akashi have allegedly already found new distinguished retreats. Stoltenberg is to become the new Norwegian ambassador in the orderly Denmark in the fall, and Akashi wants to reestablish his disputed reputation as "the man for special tasks" in the UN seat in Vienna as the head of the Palestinian Aid Foundation or the world organization's agency for fight against narcotics. Despite all the sound, the fury, and the bitterness of most of the Croatian public, they have established themselves in their ethereal diplomatic circles as people who have done "all that was possible" under "extremely difficult conditions." The two of them were not as picturesque [slikovit] as French General Morillon, as harsh and cynical as Thornberry, or as dazed and grinning as Nambiar. Mastery in that sort of diplomacy is measured by well-acted modesty, so it is actually important for them to remain all the more inconspicuous the more they appear on the front pages. Vance has at least remained like a label without content, whereas even someone like Carter went out like a short-lived twinkling comet in the stormy Balkan skies.

How important are these alternations of officials at all? The international mediators themselves are also, for the most part, hostages of their respective national policies and of the momentary forces in the broken circle of the powerful and the most important things they can do depend on the "goodwill of the parties to the conflict," although personal inclinations, biases, behavior, and patience in bearing everything and everyone do play a significant role as well. In former times, Owen was the first in England to propose the "bombing of Serbia," only to be regarded as a representative of Albion's reliance on Belgrade later, and he played this part in such an open way at times that even the British ambassadors in Zagreb disclaimed his upsetting acrobatics. Therefore, it is very difficult to guess in advance how someone will behave on the basis of what they said and did before; Croatian diplomats are also ordered to defend everything that ever might enter the mind of the "unmistakable" Croatian leadership without hesitation.

Under such circumstances, will the Croats' demand for the final say when it comes to the future composition of the halved peacekeeping forces really be decisive? Lately, Croatian diplomacy has started imitating Badel's [brandy producer] slogan "Few, but good"—so that they have even started deciding on who they should scornfully see off, and who they should welcome with a warm embrace; who they would like to have as the envoy, and who as the commander. Some of their initial ideas were ridiculed as soon as they were mentioned: Some sort of "Contact Group" troops do not even exist; in the same way, it could be guessed in advance that the Americans and Germans would only be able to put up their flags symbolically—whereas the Russians, the French, and the English are already in Croatia anyway. Some of those who are particularly favored by Zagreb are possibly not in love with the idea of exposing their troops to increasing work and danger and their budget to growing expenses; and among those circles that want to fit the most unpredictable crises into the most rational framework, there is hardly any delight to be seen about the idea of moving someone out only to move someone else in, in a very expensive and risky operation, only in order for them to do the same, or very similar, work. Butrus-Ghali will not send someone who would turn their backs on him and adore Tudjman, just like the Russians will most probably stay dug in on those places in which Belgrade is most greedily interested.

In this way, Croatia has managed to tear, at least partly, one spider's web, but it has got entangled in another one, so now, without false promises or dubious hopes, it has to dance on similar delicate strings. It is a general belief

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that "Croatia has not been lucky" when it comes to international peacemakers and mediators, but in those circles, one can also hear that they have not been lucky with Croatia. Negotiations in Zagreb were often needlessly strenuous, uncertain, inconsistent, sometimes even rude. Those who are to come now are made of the same stuff, and they are certain to bear in mind that they are entering a country that humiliated their predecessors by some very unpleasant campaigns. Individuals are important, but not decisive, and Croatia has entered this sort of deal with some very undiplomatic psychological blemishes. Permanent disputes and arguments have to result—just as in a marriage—in hatred and mistrust.

Catholic, Orthodox Churches Seek Reconciliation

95BA0196A Rijeka NOVI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 23 Feb 95 p 32

[Article by Croatian News and Information Agency: "Close the Book of Pain"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade (HINA)—"This was the most serious and important meeting with His Eminence Cardinal Kuharic, especially because along with current problems, including the return of bishops, priests, and refugees, the topic of religious and ethnic reconciliation was also inserted," declared Metropolitan Jovan of Zagreb, Ljubljana, and all of Italy, assessing yesterday's meeting with Cardinal Kuharic.

In a statement for Radio Belgrade, Metropolitan Jovan said that Cardinal Franjo Kuharic, archbishop of Zagreb, initiated the conversation between the two churches in order to reach an agreement between Croats and Serbs and thus solve all the problems from World War I to the present time and to "close the book of pain."

From what Metropolitan Jovan said, Cardinal Kuharic is soon to have a meeting with all the bishops from Croatia in which each of them would present the problems in his episcopate in order to find a solution and a strategy for normalizing relations. He added that "he did not know when he would return to Zagreb, because the metropolitan's residence is in ruins." "If the opportunity opened up for me to stay and work in Zagreb, it would be a sign of goodwill on the part of the Croatian Government," Metropolitan Jovan said.

In reference to alleged conversions, Metropolitan Jovan said that "there is no specific information, but that the problem exists as such as a consequence of the troubles of war."

Metropolitan Jovan of Zagreb, Ljubljana, and all of Italy spoke in favor of the return of all refugees to their homes and concluded that such "useful conversations between representatives of the Catholic and Orthodox churches" should continue as soon as possible, Radio Belgrade reported yesterday.

Second Anniversary of 7th Guard Brigade

95BA0196F Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 27 Feb 95 p 2

[Article by K. Gumbas and K. Skocibusic: "A Proud War Career"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Varazdin—The 7th Guard Brigade of the Croatian Army [HV] celebrated its second anniversary on Sunday with a ceremonial formation in front of the Guard building in Varazdin.

It was attended by Corps General Janko Bobetko, chief of the Supreme Command of the Croatian Army; Gojko Susak, defense minister and emissary of President Franjo Tudjman; Josip Juras, deputy defense minister; and Major General Mladen Markac, assistant minister of internal affairs.

Following the ceremonial review of members of the brigade, Brigadier Ivan Korade, the brigade's commander, spoke about its origin and spoke with pride about its career in the war and its readiness to perform all missions required of it by the Supreme Command.

The members of the brigade are patriots from all over Croatia, but most of them come from the Croatian Zagorje, the Varazdin region, Medjumurje, the Drava Valley, Prigorje, and Slavonia. Korade particularly emphasized the success the brigade achieved on the Karlovac, Zadar, and Dubrovnik battlefields, adding that the brigade had matured to become one of the most elite units of the HV. Korade recalled all the members of this brigade who were killed and promised aid to their families.

Janko Bobetko, chief of the Supreme Command of the HV, particularly emphasized in his speech the successes of the brigade in the Dubrovnik theater, emphasizing that he always knew that every mission assigned the 7th Guard Brigade would be performed in exemplary fashion, which is an indication of its preparedness for the performance of all missions.

Bobetko went on to speak about the pressures that have been exerted in recent days on Croatia because of termination of the mandate of the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] in both the military and political areas. "The Croatian Army is well prepared and fit, and nothing can frighten us from defending ourselves and also, if need be, liberating militarily the occupied regions of the Republic of Croatia," Bobetko said.

Defense Minister Gojko Susak conveyed the greetings of Dr. Franjo Tudjman, president, and recalled those from Varazdin who were defenders of Vukovar. He said of the review of the units of the 7th Guard Brigade that this is not a threat to anyone, but a peace parade.

At the end of the ceremonies, the best fighting men were presented awards and recognition in the form of pistols, money awards, and seven-day leaves at the seaside.

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Krajina, Croatia Differences on Mandate, Name

LD2203161595 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1438 GMT 22 Mar 95

[By TANJUG diplomatic editor Stevan Cordas]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, March 22 (TANJUG)—Serb Krajina and Croatia have not narrowed the gap triggered by different views on the future U.N. Protection Force mandate and name, sources close to Serb Krajina president's office said Wednesday.

The only progress made by U.N. mediator Thorvald Stoltenberg in talks with Serb Krajina and Croatian officials over the past two days, is the two sides' readiness to observe the ceasefire agreement, reached in Zagreb last March, and to resume talks on economic issues, the sources said.

Stoltenberg is now to tackle a really delicate task. He must immediately send to U.N. Secretary-General Butrus Butrus-Ghali a report on the talks held in Belgrade and Zagreb.

About the strength of that report, Butrus-Ghali is soon to report to the U.N. Security Council, which is working on three draft resolutions concerning the future of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] in the former Yugoslavia.

The three draft resolutions would respectively refer to the UNPROFOR presence in Serb Krajina, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM].

U.N. circles say the work on the three draft resolutions has been frozen until after Butrus-Ghali's report.

The basic difference in the Knin and Zagreb positions concerns the character of modified UNPROFOR mandate and its new name.

Serb Krajina President Milan Martic told Stoltenberg that it was up to the U.N. Security Council whether it would change the number of U.N. peacekeepers or not. But, he said, a change in their name was out of the question.

The word 'protection' must not be dropped from UNPROFOR's new name, as required by Croatia, he said.

Moreover, Serb Krajina cannot agree to Croatia's request for the control of the border with the Bosnian Serb republic and Yugoslavia.

The peace plan, proposed by former negotiator Cyrus Vance, would thus be violated. Item one in the plan states that any prejudging of a political solution to the Krajina-Croatia issue is ruled out.

Under the Vance plan, UNPROFOR was deployed in Serb Krajina in the spring of 1992.

Serb Krajina political circles say that, as far back as 1992, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 769 which provided for the control of borders, but it has never been implemented because that would be in violation of the Vance plan.

Some of the other resolutions concerning Serb Krajina have had a similar fate.

U.N. experts say the Vance plan is 'elder' than U.N. Security Council resolutions to this effect.

Consequently, it is uncertain what will happen, if the U.N. Security Council adopts the U.S. draft resolution on a modified UNPROFOR mandate in the U.N. protected areas (UNPAs).

To implement a resolution calling for changes in UNPROFOR mandate and name, the United Nations would have to annul the Vance plan, which is evidently not so simple.

This is precisely what Croatia wants, because it regards the plan as spoiling its planned integration of Serb Krajina into Croatia.

Given the circumstances, it is hard to say what Knin-Zagreb relations would be like in the near future.

Zagreb has announced that the territory of Serb Krajina will not be under U.N. protection after the expiry of the current UNPROFOR mandate on March 31. That is why it insists on leaving out the word 'protection' from the UNPROFOR name.

This is not only linguistic acrobatics. A large number of Western analysts say that different views on the new UNPROFOR name could rekindle war between Croatia and Serb Krajina, with unforeseeable consequences.

Martic Sends Letter to UN Security Council

LD2303112895 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1019 GMT 23 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 23 Mar (TANJUG)—Milan Martic, president of the Republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] today sent a message to the president of the Security Council, Chinese Ambassador Li Zhaoxing, in which he requests that the Security Council "does not adopt new decisions and resolutions only on the basis of the demands and arguments of the Croatian side but that it take into consideration the demands and arguments of the RSK."

In his message, a copy of which was sent to TANJUG, Martic stresses that he is requesting this on the basis of "Chapter Six of the UN Charter which envisages the existence of internationally unrecognized states and their equality in disputes before UN bodies with internationally recognized states."

"Our state is the only guarantee for the biological survival of the Serb people, because the Croats both in the World War I and II perpetrated genocide against the

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Serbs," the RSK president stressed and explained that the RSK had shown in many documents that "the Republic of Croatia, by its state terror, had forced the Serbs to proclaim their own state."

Martic points out in his message that Thorvald Stoltenberg had confirmed to him on 21 March in Belgrade that U.S. Vice President Al Gore had "promised to Croatia the annulment of the Vance plan and the passing of a resolution designed to include RSK territory in Croatia."

"This would open the doors to Croatia to complete its genocide against the Serbs in the RSK, as Croatia has done to the Serbs on the territory which it controls and from which it has expelled over 300,000 Serbs between 1990 and 1995," the RSK president stressed in his message to the president of the Security Council, Chinese ambassador Li Zhaoxing.

Martic Stresses Need for Enough Blue Helmets

AU2203173795 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 21 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Today, after the second round of talks in Belgrade with Thorvald Stoltenberg, cochairman of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia, Milan Martic, president of the Republic of Serb Krajina [RSK], stated that he is not dictating terms regarding the number of UN members in the protected zones.

Martic stressed that the RSK maintains that there should be a sufficient number of blue helmets to keep peace on the separation line between us and Croatia. Regarding the deployment of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] troops along the border with the Serb Republic and the FRY, Martic stated that those forces had the right to monitor the border before, but that Krajina will not accept the control of the RSK borders. "We hope that the UN Security Council will objectively consider all positive aspects of the Vance plan and that the peace forces will remain on the territory of the RSK as protecting forces with an unchanged mandate," said Martic.

Martic: Mikelic, Babic 'Avoid' Discussing Talks

AU2203093095 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 16 Mar 95 p 9

[Report on an interview with Krajina Serb leader Milan Martic by S.N. Adamovic; place and date of interview not given: "I Have Met With Milosevic as Well"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "One day before the meeting between President Slobodan Milosevic and the prime minister and the foreign minister of the republic of Serbian Krajina, I also met with him [Milosevic] in Belgrade, and we talked about many things in connection with the stay of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] in our region, as well as the continuation of the peace process," Milan Martic, president of the Republic of Serbian Krajina says, having been asked by NASA BORBA whether he was invited to take part in a meeting between Serbian President Milosevic, Borislav Mikelic, prime minister of the republic of Serbian Krajina government, and Milan Babic, foreign minister of republic of Serbian Krajina, which took place in Belgrade on Tuesday [14 March].

As is known, this meeting, like many others before, has remained thickly covered with the veil of secrecy for our public because neither Mikelic nor Babic were ready to make any statement regarding the issues discussed at the talks. Of course, the typically reticent president of Serbia did not make any comment, explanation, or any other sort of statement for the public, either.

We asked the president of republic of Serbian Krajina how he interpreted Milosevic's meeting with Babic and Mikelic, since it came about precisely at the moment immediately after Martic's initiative to demand prime minister Mikelic's removal was not passed by the republic of Serbian Krajina assembly.

"I see no reason to draw such a connection because this topic was also discussed at the meeting. It is known that prime minister Mikelic heads the economic negotiating team in which Babic also takes part and that, if UNPROFOR stays with its mandate unchanged, the economic talks will continue," the president of republic of Serbian Krajina said.

"I think any siding of Belgrade with this or that party might be ruinous," Martic underlined, commenting on our suggestion that such thing might happen in the conflict between Mikelic and Martic. "We have to deal with our internal problems alone. Otherwise, the consequences might be really fatal. Any interference in such things as the settling of internal political problems, siding with this or that party, and particularly with the party that dodges the question of responsibility for its own work, or rather idleness, would be viewed, to put it mildly, as a sign of ill will toward us.

"President Milosevic may invite for a meeting those whom he considers to be relevant, which also means Mikelic and Babic. It would be normal, however, for the prime minister and foreign minister to inform me, as president, on such talks, which they are avoiding doing. Unfortunately, despite my efforts, Mikelic and Babic are avoiding consulting with me on issues crucial for the destiny of our state. More precisely, I may say that for the past several months no such cooperation exists whatsoever, and I consider this to be an attempt to introduce parallelism in decisionmaking, which may have catastrophic consequences for the republic of Serbian Krajina," Milan Martic said.

Answering perhaps the most difficult question regarding Babic's personal motivation to meet with Milosevic, Martic said that it would be logical for Babic to observe the interests of the Krajina people and global Serbian interests. "It is possible, of course, that his motivation was personal or partisan. It is a matter of taste," Martic concluded.

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[Box, p 9]

Martic made a statement for NASA BORBA yesterday on the latest events regarding the UNPROFOR's stay in the UN Protected Areas. On this occasion, he repeated that with regard to Tudjman's latest decision, such a development did not surprise anybody in Krajina. "It was all a diplomatic game that was not initiated by Zagreb, intended to put pressure on us and the UN Security Council. It also helped Tudjman to improve his ratings considerably, but these will fall back after this decision and he will have great problems with the opposition in explaining what Zagreb has received in exchange for this radical change of attitude," Martic believes.

"As for Zagreb's other expectations that UNPROFOR will block the border between the republic of Serbian Krajina and the Serbian republic [Serbian entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina] or Yugoslavia, no such thing will happen as long as I am the president of republic of Serbian Krajina," he underlined.

He added that peacekeeping forces are already positioned on the borders and they, as observers, do not bother Krajina. Martic stressed, "however, the Krajina Serbs will not accept any blockade of the border between the republic of Serbian Krajina and the Serbian Republic or Yugoslavia, and I do not see any way of accomplishing that."

Mikelic Criticizes Seselj's Visit to Krajina

LD2303161895 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1121 GMT 23 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 23 Mar (TANJUG)—The recent visit of Vojislav Seselj, leader of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), to the republic of Serb Krajina (RSK; Serb-held enclave in Croatia) served as an incitement to war and was directed against the interests of the Serb people, stated RSK Prime Minister Borislav Mikelic.

Mikelic said in a statement published in today's VECERNJE NOVOSTI that Seselj's pronouncements were designed to bring about a showdown "with the leadership of Serbia, or rather Slobodan Milosevic and with the government and parliament of the RSK, which definitively said 'No' to his bellicose policy in Krajina."

Everything Seselj said and how he said it in the RSK is the best indication of him and his party, which has neither economic nor political solutions for the RSK, the RSK prime minister pointed out.

According to Mikelic, Seselj's statements demonstrated that he was a "destroyer, prosecutor, and judge from public rostrums."

"What he did in the RSK—discrediting people, accusing people, and condemning them—again opens up the question of whether he should return to where he recently spent several months" (prison), Mikelic said.

Mikelic underlined his allegations by pointing to the speech by the SRS leader on Banja Luka TV where Seselj set out the radicals' plan of how they intended to destabilize relations in Serbia.

"Seselj came to the RSK to tell the people that there could be no negotiating, to provoke incidents and close the (Zagreb-Lipovac) highway, without any concern for how the spring sowing might be carried out and how the economy would operate without semiprocessed raw materials," Mikelic said.

"His watchword is to replace negotiations with guns and thus kill off the youth of Krajina," the RSK prime minister warned.

The radicals leader, the Krajina prime minister stressed, tried to discredit the government and parliament of the RSK in the RSK, via "those who have absolutely no influence in this parliament."

Although Seselj did not gain broad support, Mikelic is worried by the fact that "those who ought to have prevented such gatherings, given the declared immediate danger of war, enabled Seselj and his entourage to have police escorts from Knin to Benkovac and Okucani."

"I believe that the masks have been removed in time and the people of the RSK can recognize who is leading them where," Mikelic assessed in today's VECERNJE NOVOSTI.

Secessionist Serbs Seize 20 UN Tanks, Artillery

AU2303144295 Paris AFP in English GMT 23 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, March 23 (AFP)—Secessionist Croatian Serbs have seized 20 tanks and several artillery pieces from a UN heavy weapons collection site, a United Nations spokesman here said Thursday [23 March].

The incident occurred Tuesday at the site located in Slavonia, which is in the Serb-controlled Krajina region of Croatia, UN Protection Force spokesman Christopher Gunnes said.

The weapons seizure was the latest in a series of violations of a year-old ceasefire accord between the secessionist Serbs and the Croatian government, he said.

In the last two months, the UNPROFOR has recorded 238 violations of the accord, he added.

Grimes said that the secessionists informed the UNPROFOR earlier this week that they were planning to hold military maneuvers beginning Wednesday or Thursday.

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Direct Negotiations With Greece To Begin 6 Apr

AU2203172595 Skopje MIC in English 22 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The direct negotiations between the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] and Greece will start in the headquarters of the World organization in New York on April 6th, under the auspices of the mediator Cyrus Vance. In addition, diplomatic sources of the UN informed late last night in Athens that the dialogue would be led at the level of foreign ministers.

The same circles announced that tomorrow, the special mediator of the UN secretary-general will give the permanent representatives of the two countries at the UN, that is, the Macedonian Ambassador Denko Malevski and the Greek Zaharakis, messages with which Skopje and Athens are summoned for direct dialogue at the seat of the World organization.

Commentary on Source of Information on Greece

AU2303125895 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 21 Mar 95 p 2

[Unattributed commentary]

[FBIS Translated Text] The information released by the Macedonian Foreign Ministry yesterday is a little confusing in that it described the agreement to start direct talks between the Macedonian and Greek Governments, in accordance with the the latest announcements on the resumption of the negotiations as published in the media, as a positive step. Does this mean that the Ministry does not have reliable sources of information about the continuation of the negotiations and therefore it has to rely on the press, in this case the Greek press? Does it not know anything about it or is Foreign Minister Crvenkovski not directly involved? Would it not have been proper to issue a statement informing the public that an agreement had been reached on direct talks first instead of replying to the statement by the Greek minister in such a way?

On this occasion, we cannot help stating that there has been too much information about the dispute with Greece. Unfortunately, this time, we again learned about things from Greek sources. However, it would be wrong to put the blame on Macedonian diplomacy for being secretive when it is clear that only a few people in the country have proper information about the whole thing. Therefore, it would be pointless for us to go to the government spokesman for information for a statement. The government, it seems—which can be easily denied—has less information on this matter than the press. Foreign Minister Crvenkovski insists on the sensitive nature of his position and on excluding the media from the whole process. This is understandable, but only to a certain degree—for instance, when it concerns the viewpoints that Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] will present in its negotiations, of how far it can go, what it will demand, what concessions it can make, and so forth. However, we should not have to learn from his Greek counterpart that there has been progress in the rapprochement, that a direct meeting of foreign ministers is in the offing, and that our ministry is basing this information on the foreign press. We should simply put greater trust in our own media and our own people, because they have always reacted seriously to the Greek-Macedonian dispute, and ultimately those who are most directly involved in designing and conducting the whole strategy of negotiations have a duty and must not close their ears to public pressure and the public's thirst for information on this matter.

Tetovo Court Extends PDP President's Detention

AU2203173195 Skopje MIC in English 22 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The criminal council of the municipal court in Tetovo made a decision yesterday, at the proposal of the investigative judge, to extend the pretrial confinement of Nevzat Halili to 30 days, while the investigation continues.

Namely, Halili, president of PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity]—National Unity, is charged for "participation in a mob and obstructing an official from carrying out his duties."

The Criminal council also decided to extend the pretrial confinement of Kemal Shabani, who is facing charges of "illegal possession of firearms and explosive materials." For him, the offered bail money of 30,000 DM [German marks] has been refused. The investigation is nearing the end, both for the rector of the illegal university in Albanian language Fadil Sulejmani and Miliam Feyziu.

Report Examines Government's Macroeconomic Policy

AU2303131695 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 17 Mar 95 pp 1, 4

[Article by V. Cvetkovska: "Higher Production—Higher Exports"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The government expects a more relaxed macroeconomy than last year. This shows great optimism about the difficult measures that it intends to implement within its macroeconomic policy. The definitive proposal of the Development Ministry, based on already created and about to be created conditions in line with circumstances, produces a projection of macroeconomic elements as follows: GNP will rise 0.8 percent, industrial production 0.7 percent, and agricultural production 1.5 percent. There is optimism about exports, which are set to rise by 3.1 percent this year, with imports expected to rise by 2.1 percent. The most important part of the macroeconomic stabilization program is that inflation and wholesale price increases, according to government projections, should be at an annual 17.8 percent, or 1.4 percent per month. Some elements will have to be reduced to reach these macroeconomic targets, such as personal consumption, with

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salaried staff having a 4.7 percent salary reduction compared with December 1994, and workers 2.9 percent, while the total number of employees will fall by 1.3 percent. A fall in employment is projected in the state sector, by 4.4 percent, but the private sector is expected to have an 11-percent rise in its workforce. Investment is expected to rise in the state sector by 17.1 percent (15.6 percent last year), with private investment expected to reach 10 percent. Public finances will be backed by 41.3 percent of the gross tax revenue.

These projections of macroeconomic elements are considered realistic for several reasons, not least because the government has realized that we have a more favorable global macroeconomic balance and stability than last year, with regulation nearly finished and what is left to be done in due course, while environmental promotion is also expected. Even if they remain at the present level, we have already created alternative markets, transportation links, and bilateral economic communications with other countries, as well as with international financial institutions, all of which gives us hope for the necessary credits to achieve the reforms.

The basic tasks of macroeconomic policy, according to the government, will be a further struggle to halt inflation on three fronts: Salaries, adapting them to the real economy (state sector), fiscal policy, to provide a further deficit reduction, and, most important, monetary policy to control inflation and the money supply. Equally important are the structural reforms and their dynamization, first of all as regards privatization (by simplifying the present procedure), the revitalization of the banking system, and the restructuring of the 25 major loss-making firms.

Salaries and prices will be (although in looser frameworks) the main cornerstones as they were last year, but there will be some concessions and the rise will be put under control. They will continue to follow inflation and they will rise at 0.5 percent (in the economic sector) below inflation and 1 percent less in the civil service, but there will be a correction between the actual and projected inflation. We can expect further liberalization of salaries after June, depending on the economic trends. Prices will still be free with controls only applied to products and services of essential importance, such as bread and flour, energy, and post office services, which can fuel inflation, as well as railroads.

The goal of the fiscal measures is to reduce the deficit, with budget revenue having to increase and expenditure decrease. Taxes on wholesale goods will increase and duty-free allowances decrease by 25 percent. Taxes on oil derivatives will also increase, with the income expected to be two percent of the gross product. Budget expenditure will be decreased by reducing employment in the civil service and other similar measures. [passage omitted]

Development Minister Views Economic Climate

AU2303131595 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 15 Mar 95 p 4

[Article by S. Kiridzievska: "More Favorable Ambience for Macroeconomic Policy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] This year's macroeconomic policy will be developed in a more favorable climate than last year's because of better conditions. This is due to positive reflections on the global balance of all the elements contained in economic policy and there are real chances to achieve this, according to Bekir Zuta, minister of development at a news conference yesterday.

"As we know," said Zuta, "this document contains all the predictions, assignments, and premises for such a development in 1995. In order to avoid discrepancies with the stances of the international financial institutions, we waited for the outcome of the negotiations and the visits of experts from the IMF and the World Bank. In fact, most of the premises for this year have already been summed up in the first part of the document and some of them will be accomplished through legal regulations to complete the reform of the banking system, the operation of companies, and the restructuring of the 25 major loss makers. With the introduction of the standby loan arrangements in April the overall economic policy will be defined." Speaking about the elements in this document, Zuta stressed that monthly inflation for this year is predicted to be 1.37 percent or 17.8 percent annually. Compared with past years when the decrease in the GNP was between 12 and 15 percent, last year this decrease was 7.2 percent, but in 1995 there was 0.8 percent growth for the first time, which is certainly representative of some quality. The growth in agricultural production for this year should be 1.5 percent, and it is also expected that losses, which were about 3 percent of GNP will be eliminated. Not what is anticipated, but what is produced will be spent. It is also planned to achieve a balance between the revenue and the expenditure of the Pension Fund by June and by the end of the year the shortage of finances in this Fund are expected to be removed. This year will be also remembered by a series of investment, because the Fund for road construction and credits from the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development have created the conditions for a new credit line, which will enable the completion of the Tetovo-Gostivar and Botun-Kicevo roads. The Beljakovci-Gjusevo road is also under construction and its termination will complete the east-west corridor. There are also some investments in the telecommunications network and all this provides real possibilities for the revitalization of economic life in the country.

Informing the press about yesterday's government session, Ministerial Spokesman Gjuner Ismail said that more decisions had been reached, among which the most important was certainly for the price of bread to rise to 20 denars. The price of flour will not be affected because

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both corn and flour are available in large quantities. This is the first rise in the bread price since January 1995 and meanwhile all the expenses involved in bread prices have risen from 50 to 80 percent. This rise will increase the retail price index by 0.47 percent and the cost of living by 1.5 percent. Ismail also informed the press that the government is not authorized to give opinions on the Draft Law on the Coat of Arms of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia], and therefore it will be up to the Assembly and the Constitutional Commission to decide.

Stable Exchange-Rate Policy Squeezes Exporters

AU2303131395 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 14 Mar 95 p 4

[Commentary by J. Dzockov: "Stable Denar and Exporters"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The government's decision, under its current economic policy, to keep the denar exchange rate stable this year has blown exporters' expectations of improving their business as a result of exchange rate corrections. The government's decision is a response to the frequent commentaries about the overvalued domestic currency in relation to the world's hard currencies.

For some time now, exporters have been trying to tell the public and the government that their products are sold "for nothing" on the world's markets when denars are exchanged for hard currency. It was not easy to explain that the economy loses more than it gains when it decides to export its own products. Exporters said that the relatively small market for their goods had simply forced them to accept losses simply in order to keep their production lines going. In the past, they were used to such problems being solved by government intervention. That is why a lot of companies had hoped to find support from the government to solve problems that had emerged as a result of domestic economic weaknesses.

Since the companies' interests were at stake, it was worth trying to get help, deliberately or unintentionally forgetting that the government's influence on exchange rates has greatly decreased. The several interventions by the National Bank of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] in which it bought surplus hard currency on the market did not help, however. The intention was to prevent a further "strengthening" of the denar. In fact, such intervention can only be accomplished if the government is capable of providing enough denars or hard currency to affect the market. Normally, intervention does not mean additional money is printed because this could have enormous consequences and fuel inflation. The hard currency market in our country is very sensitive and reacts promptly to anything that could affect the denar exchange rate. Businessmen probably overlooked this when they insisted that the government regulate monetary policy, which could ultimately mean a return to times when the government fixed exchange rates to suit its own purposes.

Stability of the denar is also one of the conditions set by international financial institutions, and one of the conditions for financial assistance was to stabilize the economy. In requiring this, conditions were created for reducing interest rates and, as a consequence, for providing cheaper loans that could be spent on production needs. Businessmen probably figured out what the catch was to this solution and they refrained from emphasizing the problem of the "overvalued" denar. Instead, stimulating the economy emerged as a possible solution. A debate began in which it was argued that the government should provide incentives to exporters if it wanted them to be present on foreign markets and thus provide the government with the needed hard currency.

We are not opposed to following a stimulative economic policy when it is a matter of exports but there is a strong impression that the blame for the often poor business performance that exists is sought outside the factories. We understand problems of an objective nature such as the embargo and blockade, high-cost transportation, and the element of risk in trading which were stated along with the requests of the businessmen, but there was too much criticism of the government and not enough of one's own failures. Part of the problems are due to poor organization, low production, bad quality, and high-cost production that is not internationally competitive.

The fact that such stimulative measures must be funded by the national budget, which itself receives its revenues from the economy, shows that this is the real problem, and providing new money means delving deep into company coffers, which are empty anyway.

The view of the Chamber of Commerce is clear: Exports must be assisted. Nevertheless, they are not sure themselves how to provide the money needed for such support, and so the problem is shifted to the government.

Privatization Agency on Property Transformation

AU2303131495 Skopje MIC in English 22 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Up to March 15 inclusive, the Privatization Agency received 302 complete privatization programs, of which 33 apply to large companies, 61 to middle-sized companies, and 208 to small companies.

139 of them have received decisions for accepted transformation from the Commission for Privatization of the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] Government, of which 16 are for large companies, 20 for middle-sized, and 103 for small companies, was said yesterday at the press conference of the Agency.

Around 600 companies have given notices for invitations to the former owners, which means that they have started drawing up the privatization program, and the programs are expected to be submitted to the Agency.

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As for the controls of the old privatizations conducted according to the former law of Prime Minister Ante Markovic, 339 have been carried out so far, while reports for successfully controlled transformations have been issued for 319. Otherwise, 450 companies have to be subject to such controls, and they have to be completed by the end of April.

The internal stock exchange of the Agency, which was supposed to start word today, will start on March 28 at 1000. The first to go on sale will be the shares of "Oteks" from Ohrid, while the shares of "Javor" from Bitola and "Evropa" from Skopje will be sold during April.

As it was said in the press conference, together with February 28, the government received $10 million, mostly from funds paid on the basis of old privatizations, plus 1 million DM [German marks] from trapped foreign currency deposits.

Toward the beginning of next week, the Privatization Agency will put another 12 companies on offer, of which eight are according to the model of purchase of ideal part of the company, while four are according to the model management buyout.

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Thaler Comments on EU, Quarrel With Italy

AU2303082595 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 22 Mar 94 p 9

[Article by Reinhard Olt: "Joy About Rome, Hope for Brussels"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ljubljana, 21 March—Zoran Thaler is proud about "his" success. The Slovene foreign minister himself opened EU negotiations regarding an association agreement with Slovenia in Brussels last week; everything indicates, Thaler says, that an agreement will be concluded before the end of the French Council presidency in June. Italy's relations with Slovenia have decisively improved since Mrs. Agnelli has been heading the Foreign Ministry in Rome in Dini's transition government. After talking to her, Italy changed its mind about obstructing the beginning of negotiations with its veto. "The language changed" in Rome when Mrs. Agnelli assumed office. Therefore, he was able to come to that agreement with her, according to which Slovenia's EU ambitions must to be separated from the quarrels with Rome. In addition, he agreed with Mrs. Agnelli to look for a settlement of the Italian-Slovene conflict in a joint committee headed by the two foreign ministers' personal representatives "in a positive atmosphere."

Despite this optimistic assessment, in an interview with this newspaper, the new Slovene foreign minister does not hide his skepticism about the fact that, as a result of the unstable political situation in Rome, irritations might crop up again. Recently, Mr. Tremaglia, chairman of the Italian Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee (he belongs to Fini's "National Alliance" and does not hide his loyalty to Mussolini), indicated during a visit to Ljubljana that a rightist government in Rome would declare any foreign policy agreements concluded by Mrs. Agnelli invalid. Therefore, Thaler said, as far as the EU is concerned, he considers it decisive for Slovenia "to be on the inside and not on the outside."

Thaler denies that Slovenia might lose room to maneuver if the EU requests during the association negotiations that Rome's demands for the return of property expropriated in 1945 be taken into account. This is why it would not have been better to first settle the conflict with Rome and then (if there is no longer the danger that Italy might one day deny Slovenia full membership) hold association negotiations. Anyway, Ljubljana has promised Brussels that it will adjust the national constitution, which prohibits the purchase of Slovene property by foreigners, to European standards, in such a way that real estate ownership becomes possible beyond the already permitted form of utilization (partial ownership of companies). A government proposal for a corresponding amendment to the Constitution has been submitted to Parliament.

Apart from that, his European interlocutors—such as, most recently, EU Commissioner Van den Broek on the occasion of a visit to Ljubljana two weeks ago—made it clear that, according to the Foreign Ministers' Council formal decision of 5 March, Brussels does not intend to establish any connection between Slovenia's desire for integration in the EU and its bilateral quarrel with Italy. Apart from that, it is certainly better for his country if the community of 15 has a moderating effect on the parties to the conflict in the northern Adriatic, than for Slovenia to face the EU member Italy on its own.

Thaler evades answering the question of whether Ljubljana might not have spared itself the delay (because of the then quarrel in the Slovene Government) on EU association, if it had accepted the basic agreement concluded by then Foreign Ministers Peterle (Slovenia) and Martino (Italy) in Aquileia. On principle, he refused to comment on his predecessor, who left office at the end of September 1994. Thus, the document envisaged that "any real estate transactions in Slovenia within the framework of privatization" should have been suspended at the end of 1994 because of Italy's claims. This is not the only reason new negotiations were necessary.

Furthermore, it is indispensable to "hold up a mirror" to Italy. In the property problem there is a difference between "optants," those former inhabitants of Slovenia who, in Thaler's view, "voluntarily decided in favor of Italy" in the past, and the so-called Esuli—that is, those Italians who, like Slovenes, were expropriated under Tito, fled, or were driven out. Slovenia cannot grant any special rights to the optants. In addition, the issue of the rights and the protection of the Slovene minority in Italy had to be broached, because, in contrast to the ethnic Italians in Istria, the protection of whom as a minority is guaranteed in the Slovene Constitution, the Slovenes in Trieste and Friuli-Venezia-Giulia do not have comparable rights, even though both Rome and Ljubljana have signed the European Minority Charter. A bilateral minority protection agreement such as that concluded with Hungary, is also indispensable with Italy.

In this connection, Thaler ignores the fact that he obviously did not broach this controversial issue during his stay in Rome because, according to the Slovene news agency, he felt obliged to sent a letter to Mrs. Agnelli after his visit demanding negotiations about the "justified protection of the Slovene minority" within the framework of a joint committee, following criticism from the parliament in Ljubljana. Peterle's Christian Democrats point out that his predecessor and Martino achieved basic agreement also on this issue.

Thaler also briefly mentions his country's relations with its neighbors Austria and Croatia as well as other states that have emerged from Yugoslavia. Cooperation with Vienna is fruitful. Austria has offered its good services both for talks with Brussels, where it has always acted as Slovenia's advocate anyway, and also for talks with Rome. According to Thaler, 97 percent of the border quarrels with Croatia have been settled, and geodesists are currently marking the border. He has agreed with the

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Croatian foreign minister that a joint government committee is to decide on the location of the common border on the Adriatic coast and in Istria. Slovenia, Thaler notes in conclusion, is worried about rising tensions at the border between Serbia and Croatia, and is afraid of the consequences of a new outbreak of war there. From all of which it has derived the only possible conclusion for its national security—to become a member of the EU as quickly as possible and to speedily become integrated in the Western European Union and NATO.

Slovene, Italian Proposals Contrasted

95BA0190A Ljubljana MLADINA in Slovene 28 Feb 95 p 19

[Unattributed article: "The Opposing Proposals"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *A summary of the most important uncoordinated provisions from the proposals for a "joint statement" by Slovenia and Italy.*

Minorities

1. The Italian proposal: On the basis of a memorandum of agreement, Slovenia and Italy will conclude an agreement on the protection of the Italian minority in Slovenia. Slovenia will recognize the autochthonous nature of the Italian minority on its territory, "the independent legal status of the Union of Italians" as "the remnant of the Italian national community that was to a large extent forced to leave the area where it had historically been settled because of the well-known political events after World War II." Slovenia agrees with the need for uniform political and constitutional treatment of the Italians in Croatia and in Slovenia.

The Slovene proposal: Slovenia will preserve the rights of the Italian community in Slovenia, the level of employment, and the representation of Italians in the State Assembly and local self-government.

2. The Italian proposal: Italy will "assign" the building of the National Center at St. Ivan's in Trieste "for the social and cultural activities of the Slovene national minority," and "give appropriate consideration to the needs and requests of the Slovene community with respect to cultural and educational initiatives, and financial resources will be ensured for the Slovene community's activity again, in the same amount as in 1993."

The Slovene proposal: The two countries will proceed on the basis of the Osimo treaty. The Italian Government promises that by 13 December 1995, with the participation of the Slovene minority, a law will be adopted on the protection of the Slovene minority in Italy, "modeled after the laws that already apply to the protection of the German and French minorities in Italy." The law will ensure equal treatment of the minority in all three provinces and specify the manner in which financial resources will be provided for the community's work.

Property

3. The Italian proposal: The two governments will settle the unresolved issues regarding the real estate "that the Yugoslav authorities, in their time, nationalized, seized, and expropriated."

The Slovene proposal: The two governments will abide by the current situation (*pacta sunt servanta* [treaties are to be observed]), and also the London memorandum, the Osimo accords, and the Rome agreement.

4. The Italian proposal: The Slovene Government will adopt measures for the return of the real estate that will be publicly owned on the day of the joint statement to the former Italian owners and their descendants, and adapt its Constitution to European standards. By 31 March 1995, Slovenia will allow the Italian citizens who are the former owners of the real estate, their descendants, or claimants to the real estate, to have access to the Slovene real estate market "in accordance with the principle of nondiscrimination," and to make purchases in it. For the real estate that is not publicly owned, Slovenia will allow the former owners whose real estate was seized by the Yugoslav authorities the right of prior purchase. At the same time, "the Italian Government is prepared to consent to having the value of that real estate subtracted from the remaining installments of the debt" of Yugoslavia to Italy in accordance with the Rome agreement of 1983.

The Slovene proposal: Slovenia will coordinate its property legislation and other legislation with European Union legislation "in the same way as was done by other members of the European Union, and as it will be done by those who become members."

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Federal

Article Assesses Foreign Secret Agents in Army

AU2303112395 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 19 Mar 95 p 13

[Article by Radovan Pavlovic: "Unskilled Spies From the 'Brother Republics'"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Yugoslav armed forces have in the last few months become a target for spies and foreign intelligence agencies. This has been confirmed by a recent military and civil security action as a result of which three officers were arrested under the justified suspicion of having acted as spies on behalf of the Croatian secret service. There have also been several earlier military court verdicts following evidence of some officers' spy activities.

Further investigation will show whether Captain Enver Cavkusic (Backa Topola Garrison), Lieutenants Zoltan Kovac (Podgorica) and Benjamin Zuban (Subotica) actually organized a spy network on behalf of Croatia, and what data they forwarded to their superiors. Until the court has completed its work, we would recall that up until now, the spy network cases that have come to light have displayed a certain pattern—the army has been a primary target of the secret services from neighboring, former Yugoslav republics.

According to evidence presented at the proceedings, agencies with people planted among the Yugoslav army officers were from Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Who are their agents, and what sort of information were they gathering in the Yugoslav army?

Examples From Legal Practice

Senior Platoon Leader Bela Nadj worked for the Croatian security service under the operative pseudonym "Beli." He was sentenced to five years in prison for having regularly sent reports on combat readiness and the state of morale in the Navy to his contact in Zagreb. Travelling to Split or telephoning, "Beli" forwarded information on our ship movements, their maintenance, personnel composition in the barracks, naval subversive troops' readiness, as well as Muslim and Croat officers in the Yugoslav Army stationed in security units.

First Class Captain Rizvan Halilovic was simultaneously an agent for Alija Izetbegovic's army; he organized arms supplies for the Muslims and even showed some confidential army documents to Pakistani Army intelligence.

A recently sentenced lieutenant colonel from the Uzice Corps, L.D. (we are using the initials because the sentence has still not come into effect), was sentenced to two years in prison in the preliminary trial for having colluded with the Slovene secret service. He informed them about the number and morale of our soldiers.

At the beginning of the month, two officers from Kosovska Mitrovica Garrison were sentenced to prison for having disclosed a military secret. To be accurate, Capt. Azem Muljaj and Lt. Eljham Lugici do not fall into the category of traditional spies since they did not work for a foreign secret service. They forwarded confidential army documents to the so-called security service of the illegal "Kosovo Republic." [passage omitted]

Professor Miomir Lutovac, former judge of the Supreme Military Court, claims that nowadays the work of intelligence agents differs from the times when army security people had to deal with the secret services of big powers with big shots. Of course, the field of interest for spies has always been more or less the same—they gather information on the number and composition of army troops, general mood and morale among the soldiers, quality of command personnel (including assessing the terrain—as to which ones of the important commanders could be "worked on"), the methods and quality of training, war plans, material reserves, options for the conduct of the war, the production of new weapons, and so on. As a former head of the army security service told us, these days, for example, a proper delicacy and a bait for secret agents is to find out the substance of the recent military agreement between Russia and the FRY.

The people we spoke to say that a characteristic thing about modern espionage is that it is in a way "primitive." Namely, recruited collaborators are mostly officers separated from their families by the war; their wives or children have remained in the breakaway republics, which the authorities of those countries use for traditional blackmailing. "Intelligence agents from those countries choose spies from among officers using the most banal reasons to blackmail them: permission to enter their country, retirement, citizenship, promises that their wives would be secured jobs, offers to pay off their apartments," the former head of the army intelligence service says.

Our anonymous interlocutor says that this, just like the fact that many of the infiltrated agents were detected very quickly, reflects the lack of professionalism of those agencies. The intelligence agencies of the breakaway republics have no experts, no professionals; the old experts were chased off (during and after the war there was a famous purge of counterintelligence and intelligence officers of the Yugoslav People's Army), and the new people have organized agencies that are nothing but an embarrassment.

"Agencies and armies whose collaborators fail so easily, at the very beginning, are bad." They are obviously inexperienced, "green," people for one use only, and one cannot really talk about serious secret service activities—that is the opinion of the former head of the Security Service of JNA [Yugoslav People's Army]. He recalled that great agents spend all of their working lives as such, and only after they have retired does one find out who they are and for whom they used to work.

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Avramovic, Bulatovic Discuss Military Finance

LD2303121795 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1032 GMT 23 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 23 Mar (TANJUG)—Dr. Dragoslav Avramovic, governor of the Yugoslav National Bank, today visited the Defense Ministry where he had talks with Defense Minister Pavle Bulatovic and his colleagues on current questions of the financing of Yugoslavia's military industry.

The information service of the Federal Ministry for National Defense has announced that Bulatovic acquainted Avramovic with the situation in the military industry, stressing that, despite numerous problems, development, and production capacity and top-level specialists have been preserved. Our request that conditions for the work of the military industry be secured does not mean only support for these enterprises, but it is also advocacy of the strengthening of the combat capability of our army, in view of the fact that under sanctions the forces of the defense system are based on the capabilities of our own military industry, Minister Bulatovic stressed.

With its developed technologies and specialist personnel, our military industry will have a big task once sanctions are lifted: that of reintegrating the economy into the discriminating world market, Governor Avramovic assessed and added that no sensible person should gamble with the future of this branch of industry.

The Yugoslav National Bank, within the limits of its possibilities will, according to the governor, support efforts to revitalize production in military factories and thus also preserve its supreme resources, the statement says at the end.

Assembly Chamber Holds Confidence Vote Debate

AU2103220995 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 21 Mat 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Today, deputies of the Federal Assembly Citizens' Chamber resumed the first session of the first regular sitting, which had opened three weeks ago. Several bills were adopted at the session. Late in the afternoon, a debate was opened on the proposal of a vote on confidence in the Federal Government regarding its decision on the BORBA daily. Here is a report by Vladimir Nikolic:

[Begin recording] [Nikolic] [Passage omitted] Late in the afternoon, debate was opened on the occasion of the initiative of the opposition parties, to hold a vote of confidence in the Federal Government regarding its decision on the BORBA daily. Expounding on the proposal, Srdjan Darmanovic said that the Federal Government violated the Constitution with its decision on BORBA whereby it had taken upon itself the powers of the Federal Assembly. For this reason, a vote on confidence in the Government should be held. This is how Federal Prime Minister Radoje Kontic replied to this:

[Kontic] First of all, one should point out, once again, what is involved here is a property dispute. Neither the Federal Assembly as a founder of the BORBA newspaper, nor the Federal Government ever made decisions on the transformation of the BORBA newspaper, nor did they give consent to the merger, that is, the closure of the Borba Enterprise. This was done by some unauthorized individuals on behalf of the state who then gave away a very significant social property for symbolical compensation. [passage omitted]

[Nikolic] According to the federal prime minister, the dispute started because of some irregularities in the procedure of BORBA transformation and was initiated—according to law—by the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office in order to protect the rights and interests of the federal state as regards the use, administration, and management of property. The Federal Government did not initiate this procedure, did not appear as a participant in it while it lasted, and did not, through its decisions or otherwise, affect the work the of corresponding bodies, the payment service, the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office, or the commercial courts. The election of political officers belongs to the authority of the Federal Assembly, while their appointment, being an executive duty, belongs to the jurisdiction of the Federal Government. [passage omitted]

[Kontic] According to everything that I have said, it is clear that by issuing the ruling to appoint the Borba acting director, the Federal Government did not violate the Constitution, but, on the contrary, it met its obligation that results from its Constitutional powers and the decision to take over the founding rights of BORBA, a public medium performing a task of a federal interest.

[Nikolic] From everything that has been said, one can clearly conclude that the Federal government has not violated the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in any way, Prime Minister Kontic asserted categorically. [passage omitted]

Having realized the importance of timely and objective information about events at home and abroad, the Federal Government devoted special attention to the federal media. In the case of the appointment of the acting director of the Borba Newspaper Publishing Enterprise and the chief editor of the BORBA newspaper, the Federal Government acted according to its powers regarding the media founded by the Federation, so it cannot be accused—under the guise of the freedom of press—for having performed tasks within its jurisdiction efficiently and responsibly.

[Kontic] How far the democratization of the information domain has gone is best demonstrated by the fact that nearly 2,000 public media have been registered in our country, many of them privately owned, something that

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a few countries can boast of, even including those belonging to the so-called developed democracies.

[Nikolic] The attempt to transfer a property dispute regarding Borba to the field of the smothering of the independent media, and to accuse the Federal Government of this, has a primarily political character and cannot maintain a serious critical approach, Federal Prime Minister Radoje Kontic said.

[Kontic] This assessment has been corroborated by the fact that, in a very short period of time after the original status was resumed at BORBA, a new newspaper, NASA BORBA, was registered and, as far as I know, it has been coming out regularly and doing so on the basis of the well-known and recognizable previous editorial policy. And nobody is obstructing it.

This is the best denial of the claims that the freedom of the press is being smothered, as the group of deputies claims.

[Nikolic] From this entire statement, Prime Minister Kontic said, it is clear that, in the case of BORBA, the Federal Government has not violated the Constitution in any way or smothered the freedom of the press. The Federal Government has acted according to its rights and obligations regarding federal public media. It appointed the acting director of the Borba Newspaper Publishing Enterprise and chief editor of the BORBA daily only after a valid court statement was issued and thereby created basic prerequisites for the efficient functioning of this newspaper. This assertion has been corroborated by the valid ruling of the Belgrade Commercial Court, Prime Minister Kontic said and added:

[Kontic] It is therefore clear that the demand for a vote of no-confidence in the Federal Government was inspired by political motives. In the absence of real arguments, there was an attempt to create a so-called political case out of a property and legal case. I am certain that the deputies have seen through this intention. It is clear that this time, again, there are no constitutional, legal, or political reasons for a motion of no-confidence in the government.

[Nikolic] The debate on this case in the Citizens' Chamber is under way. [end recording]

The Citizens' Chamber session ended about 15 minutes ago and it is expected to resume tomorrow.

Deputies Back Government

AU2203133895 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 22 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The federal government has received the support of the deputies in the Chamber of Citizens of the Federal Assembly during a discussion on the opposition deputies' call for a no confidence motion in the government because of the newspaper BORBA. The deputies stressed that the government has taken measures in accordance with the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and federal laws, and stopped the misappropriation of social property.

The fact that there are over 2,000 newspapers published in our country confirms there is full freedom of the press. This was stated at the session of the Chamber of Citizens.

Serbia

Sandzak Bosniak Soldiers Submitted to 'Torture'

AU2203205695 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 22 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Eighteen young men of Bosniak Muslim nationality from the Sandzak towns of Novi Pazar, Sjenica, Tutin, Rzaj, and Bijelo Polje who served in the Prizren Garrison of the Army of the so-called Yugoslavia were submitted to extremely inhuman and humiliating treatment, even physical torture by military authorities before the end of their Army service.

On the night of 25 February, they were taken to the military security service premises in Prizren, where they were tortured in various ways. Particularly badly treated were 13 young men who, as they say themselves, spent the night standing and facing the wall. If any of them, being exhausted and beaten up, were to close his eyes, a policeman would come over and hit him with a nightstick. [passage omitted]

During the tortuous 20 hours, the young men were forced to admit that they would go to Turkey and then to Bosnia to fight against the Serbs and to say that the Party of Democratic Action is arming itself, it is said in the announcement issued by the Muslim National Council of Sandzak.

Montenegro

Akashi Says No Need for Concern Over Prevlaka

LD2203212995 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1759 GMT 22 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Herzeg Novi, 22 Mar (TANJUG)—There are no immediate reasons for the people in this area to be concerned, Yasushi Akashi said this evening in Herzeg Novi, following his tour of Prevlaka and the talks with Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic.

The UN secretary general's special envoy for the former Yugoslavia said that the UN military observers in the Prevlaka area are doing their job well, and that the UN will invest fresh efforts to, as he put it, stabilize the situation in the area.

At an impromptu news conference following the talks with Bulatovic, Akashi said that he told the Montenegrin

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president that the Croatian side acknowledges the need to create a joint interstate commission for Prevlaka, which would, according to him, remove the causes for concern.

Akashi said that he is particularly encouraged by Montenegro's commitment to solve the controversial issue of Prevlaka by peaceful means.

The Montenegrin president stressed that he is satisfied with Akashi's message, conveying to him the readiness of the Republic of Croatia to solve the existing misunderstandings concerning Prevlaka through the mechanisms provided by the London conference and [former Yugoslav president Dobrica] Cosic and Tudjman's declaration of 30 September 1992.

Bulatovic said that he received guarantees that the new fortifications built in the UN protected zone are not manned, and that there are no personnel and equipment in them which could jeopardize peace and stability in the region.

The Montenegrin president expressed the hope that the reactivation of the interstate commission for preventing border incidents, which is to follow shortly, accompanied by greater political responsibility, will contribute to removing the existing fears on both sides.

According to Bulatovic, the talks on Prevlaka will proceed faster than the process of solving the global problems of the former Yugoslavia.

Answering a correspondent's question, Akashi said that there is the possibility that a wise solution may be found to the controversial issue of Prevlaka owing to Montenegro's balanced stances.

During his visit to Herzeg Novi today, Yasushi Akashi and Bulatovic toured the Boka Kotorska Bay by helicopter.

Akashi left Herzeg Novi this evening for Dubrovnik.

Bulatovic Greets Acceptance of Talks on Prevlaka

AU2203212495 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 22 Mar 95

[Report by Miodrag Vukovic—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Vukovic] Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic and Yasushi Akashi, special envoy of the UN secretary general, discussed Prevlaka in Herzeg-Novi today. At a news conference that has just ended, the special UN secretary general's envoy said he was satisfied with the talks and the fact that Montenegro is determined to resolve all problems in a peaceful rather than a military manner:

[Akashi, in English with passage-by-passage Serbo-Croatian translation] Ladies and gentlemen! Today, I have had a (?most) useful visit to Prevlaka. My primary purpose has been to familiarize myself with this question of Prevlaka and the UN role in the demilitarization of the Prevlaka area. This has been, as you know, a subject of an agreement between the Yugoslav Republic and the Republic of Croatia, and it was also a subject of Security Concil Resolution No. 779. We are fully aware of our responsibility in that respect. I have seen the very important tasks that are carried out by UN military observers in the area and held in-depth discussions with President Bulatovic. I have been made very well aware of the position, as well as the concerns of the Republic of Montenegro in this question.

[Vukovic] The UN secretary general's special envoy conveyed Croatia's readiness to resume dialogue with the FRY, that is, to reanimate the existing state commission that will deal with the Prevlaka problem. The Montenegrin president assessed the talks with UN Special Envoy Yasushi Akashi as follows:

[Bulatovic] I am very grateful to Mr. Akashi for paying outstanding attention to this problem that has burdened the situation in the region for a long time. I am also satisfied with the information that he kindly conveyed, namely, about the readiness of the Croatian Government to resolve the existing disputes and everything that has happened in this area and justly caused the concerned of our residents, through the mechanism determined at the London Conference and subsequently signed by President Cosic and President Tudjman.

We also received guarantees that the installations built on this territory are not occupied and that they contain no personnel or hardware that could endanger the peace and stability in this region.

I hope that reanimation of the work of the interstate commission, which will take place soon, with a perhaps slightly higher level of political responsibility on behalf of those people who will be the members of this commission, will help overcome realistic fears on both sides and that there will be considerably fewer problems in this part of the Yugoslav territory.

We are of the opinion that, here, the role of Mr. Akashi and the UN peacekeepers in general is irreplaceable, and we are glad that the Croatian Government has nevertheless decided to accept the status quo on this territory, the way that best serves the interests of both sides.

Kosovo

More Serbs Request Housing in Kosovo

95BA0188J Podgorica POBJEDA in Serbo-Croatian 17 Feb 95 p 5

[Article by L. Prelevic: "One Hundred Applications a Day"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Pristina, 17 Feb—Interest in obtaining housing for returnees within the city limits of Pristina is outrunning expectations. No one remembers when so many Serbs and Montenegrins showed a desire to come back to their old home.

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Following the most recent decree of the Federal Government, interest has increased greatly, says Zlatimir Savic, secretary of the Commission of the Opstina of the City of Pristina for Monitoring Implementation of the Yugoslav Program Concerning Kosovo and Metohija. This is also confirmed by the figure on the number of applications being filed. In just seven days, nearly 700 applications were filed for allocation of housing intended for the return of Serbs and Montenegrins and to halt their possible exodus.

"These are returnees, but also people who want to live and work in Kosovo and Metohija. There has been interest in returning to Kosmet, so to speak, from all regions of Serbia, especially from Vojvodina and the central part of the republic, from Kragujevac, Kraljevo, Belgrade.... There have also been a large number from Montenegro: Ivangrad, Bijelo Polje, Podgorica.... They are all competing for one of the 122 housing units in Pristina that are to be completed no later than the end of the fall," Savic said, adding that the advertisement for allocation of those housing units was published last week. That advertisement spelled out the conditions for allocation of the units.

According to our informant, personnel needed in administrative agencies and Kosovo and Metohija's justice system and economy will have priority in allocation of the housing, in accordance with the decree of the Federal Government. Those who moved from this province before 31 December 1991 would qualify as returnees. He particularly emphasized that the applicants include a large number of people with specialized university training. They also include people who filed an application for housing several years ago and are now merely reapplying.

"The Assembly of the City of Pristina will most probably by the end of this month or the beginning of next month adopt an operational program for creating the conditions for return of the Serbs and Montenegrins who moved out earlier and for halting the exodus of these two nationalities. That program will clearly spell out the conditions and criteria for allocation of building lots, apartments, and loans for construction of family dwellings. A decision is expected soon on the allocation of plots for Serbian and Montenegrin returnees in the Pristina settlement of Dragodan."

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